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JUDGING THE JUDGES: RACIAL
DIVERSITY, IMPARTIALITY AND
REPRESENTATION ON STATE TRIAL
COURTS
SHERRILYN A. IFILL*
INTRODUCTION
Despite dramatic gains in the legislative arena in the past 20 years,'
racial diversity on state courts remains a much-lauded but seemingly
elusive goal. Only 3.8% of all state court judges are African American. 2
Among state trial court judges, only 4.1% are African American.' In
jurisdictions with large African American populations, the figures are
disturbingly similar. In New York State, for example, only 6.3% of the
state's judges were African American in 1991, although African Ameri-
cans constituted 14.3% of the state's population. 4 In Georgia, where
27% of the population is African American, only 6% of the state's
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; BA., Vassar College; JD.,
New York University School of Law. I wish to thank Taunya Banks, for her early support and belief
in my Idea," as well as Mark Feldman, Pamela Karlan and Jacqueline Berrien for their comments,
suggestions and encouragement. I also thank the Northeast Corridor Black Women's Collective
for the opportunity to present the earliest draft of this paper. I owe a great debt to the patience,
love and encouragement of my family, who coached me through the long labor and birth of this
Article. Research assistants, too many to name, provided invaluable help. Special thanks to
Michelle Saha and Kraig Long. Finally, this Article is dedicated to the African American lawyers
in Houston, Texas, whom I had the privilege of representing in their ultimately unsuccessful but
noble effort to make racial diversity on the bench a reality.
I Compare JOINT Ora. FOR POLITICAL & ECONOMIC STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS IN
UNITED STATES (1970), with Jowl' CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECONOMIC STUDIES, NUMBER OF BLACK
ELECTED OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES (1990) (showing 168 African American state legisla•
tors in 1970 and 406 in 1990, respectively.)
2 See Barbara Luck Graham, Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on State Courts: An
Overview, 74 JUDICATURE 28, 32 (1990). I focus primarily on African Americans in this Article,
but the argument I make is equally applicable to other racial "minorities." See infra note 7.
:S BAR AM E N JUDICIAL Div. TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES IN THE JUDICIARY,
TOE DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES OF TIIE UNITED STATES (May 1, 1997) (listing all African
American federal and state court judges in the United States), and NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 1995 95-96 (listing total number of state trial court
judges of general and limited jurisdiction).
4 See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY, 1 REPORT 4 & nn.1 & 3 (Jan.
1992).
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judges are African American. 5
 These figures stand in stark contrast to
the gains made by minorities in state legislatures. Those gains—directly
attributable to the Voting Rights Act's 6
 removal of the structural im-
pediments to meaningful electoral participation by minority voters—
have not been mirrored in judicial fora.?
5 See GEORGIA SUPREME COURT COMM'N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN TIIE COURT SYSTEM,
LET JUSTICE BE DONE: EQUALLY, FAIRLY, & IMPARTIALLY 52, 54 (Aug. 1995).
6
 The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C:
 § 1973c (1994), has been called "the most effective federal
civil rights statute." See Drew S. Days III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 164, 167 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). Notwithstand-
ing recent litigation defeats which may seriously roll back the gains made by African Americans
because of the Act, see, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1951 (1996) (striking down Texas's
redistricting plan that reconfigured' existing districts to create one new majority Mexican Ameri-
can and two new majority African American districts, on the grounds that it constituted racial
gerrymandering); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905-07, 919-23 (1995) (holding Georgia's
congressional districting plan that created three new majority African American districts violated
Equal Protection Clause); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 650, 635-36, 658 (1993) (striking down North
Carolina reapportionment plan that created two new majority African American districts in state's
south-central and southeastern regions), the Voting Rights Act has been a success story in the
legislative arena. But see Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1079,
1101-34 (1991) (arguing that the preoccupation with black electoral success "stifles rather than
empowers black political participation").
7 I use the term "minorities" in this Article when referring to African Americans, Mexican
Americans and other racial or ethnic groups which have traditionally suffered from discrimina-
tion to indicate their relative population within a jurisdiction. The protection of racial minorities
has been a particular focus of statutory efforts, including the Voting Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c. The Supreme Court has recognized and upheld the Voting Rights Act's particular
protection for racial minorities. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42-51 (1986). Of course,
where discrete racial groups, such as African Americans, constitute a majority of the population
in a jurisdiction, their right to be represented on the bench only assumes greater urgency..
Some observers have attributed the low number of African American judges to the compara-
tively small number of African American attorneys who are eligible to serve as state judges. Only
3.6% of U.S. lawyers are African American. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'''.
 OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1996). Until the Supreme Court outlawed the
practice, many states did not permit African Americans to attend state-run law schools. See Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631, 635-36 (1950). Most states require attorneys to be admitted to
practice for at least three years before they are eligible to serve as judges. See, e.g., CONFERENCE
OF STATE COURT ADM'RS NAT'L CM FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 1987
120-41, 260-70 (1988) (listing the various qualifications necessary to serve on state trial and
appellate courts).
A close look at the data, however, refutes this thCory. Even in those jurisdictions where many
eligible African American lawyers live and where many African American lawyers have sought
judicial election, the number of African American judges remains startlingly low. For example,
in Harris County, Texas, although there are presently 777 African American attorneys, see State
Bar of Texas Membership Department Statistics (on file with the author), and qualified African
American lawyers consistently run for state trial benches, only one of the county's trial judges is
African American. See OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN. TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, WOMEN AND MINORITY
JUDGES IN TEXAS (Mar. 1, 1996).
Moreover, although women historically have faced significant barriers to legal education, the
number of women judges has increased dramatically compared to that of African American
judges. Compare, e.g., FEMINIST MAJORITY SURVEY OF STATE COURT ADMIN. OFFICES, FEMINIST
LEADERSHIP IN THE LAW 11 990I with—1- - UNDyon MODERN COURTS, INC., THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN
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While lamented by commentators and the bar, 5 the relative paucity
of African American judges has rarely been challenged as illegal and
never as unconstitutional. Efforts to promote racial diversity on the
bench are often couched in the soft language of inclusiveness, public
confidence and promoting the appearance of justice. 9 Racial diversity
on the courts is almost never discussed in the more forceful language
of rights and representation. The tentativeness of the judicial diversity
discourse is a product in large part of continued resistance to the very
idea that judges are representatives. Indeed, to describe judges as
representatives is to invite hostility from both the bench and the bar.
Diversity efforts are countered with the argument that judges are
impartial and thus need not be representative of particular racial
groups."' Impartiality, as currently understood, stands as a barrier to
achieving racial diversity on the bench.
The importance of detachment, disinterest and impartiality to
good judging is so deeply imbedded in our legal mythology" that
acknowledging judges as representatives can be perceived as a threat
to the judicial function. The very suggestion that judges can represent
a community counters the traditional view of judges as impartial deci-
AND MINORITIES IN ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS (1985) (documenting
changes in some states in percentage of women on state courts of last resort). In Harris County,
for example, nearly one-half of the 59 district court judges arc white women, while only one
district judge is African American, See OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN. "WC. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra;
Alan Bernstein, New Order in the Court: Youth, First Terms Abound, HOUS, CHRON., Feb. 12, 1995
at IA. Nevertheless, women continue to be underrepresented on state courts as well. In the State
of Texas as a whole, for example, only 72, or 18%, of the State's 396 district court judges are
women. See OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN, Tax, Jurareim. CouNco., supra.
8 See Keith W. Watters, Behold the Dream, NAT'L B. ASS'N MAC., May-one 1996, at 1, 1 (arguing
that with only three and one-half years until the next millennium, there has been "little or no
progress in sight for the standing Of blacks" in the judiciary); see also Caitlin Francke, 7 Lawyers
Proposed for Seat on Bench; Nominating Panel List for District Court Slot Now Goes to Governor,
BALT, SUN, Sept. 20, 1996, at 113 (commenting on Maryland Governor Parris N. Glendening's
expressed commitment to achieving diversity on the state bench); Steven Kccva, Slow Integration,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 28, 28 (recounting the struggle to integrate the bench and the lack of
progress in African American appointments); Saundra Torry, Seeing a Chance for Bench That
Resembles the District, WAsn. POST, Aug. 9, 1993, at F7 (noting President Clinton's diversity pledge
to name a judiciary that "looks like America").
9 See H.T. Smith, Toward a More Diverse Judiciary, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 8 (urging ABA to
reevaluate i t, process of determining nominees for the bench to ensure it is "fostering inclusion").
IS See Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1988), reed sub nom. Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
11 See, e.g.., Justice John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address at American Bar Association
Annual Meeting 12 (Aug. 3, 1996) (transcript on file with the author); see also Arthur T.
Vanderbilt, /wigs and furors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.U. L. REIF, 1, 19
(1956). See generally Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice (address delivered at the American Bar Association annual convention in 1906),
reprinted in AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, ROSCCIE POUND—THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATIS-
FACTION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 12-13 (1956).
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sionmakers.' 2
 Reluctance to examine the potential that racial diversity
has to enhance judicial decision making often , stems from the pro-
found ,discomfort many judges and lawyers feel in challenging the
prevailing notions of impartiality in judicial decision making and in
Identifying judges as representatives."
Indeed, the right to an impartial judge is guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."
Litigants may seek to disqualify a judge who has an interest in the
outcome of the litigation, has actual bias towards one of the parties or
has even the appearance of bias." The Fourteenth Amendment has
not, however, been interpreted to compel diversity on the bench itself.
In this sense, the Fourteenth Amendment impartial judge mandate has
been narrowly interpreted to require only the individual impartiality
of judges. Under this view, due process is not offended when African
American judges are persistently excluded from the bench, nor does
due process protect against the homogeneity of interests that a racially
exclusive bench perpetuates.
In this Article, I contend that the Fourteenth Amendment's judi-
cial impartiality mandate is violated by the persistent presence of an
12
 Many proponents of judicial diversity refrain from concretely describing the contribution
minority judges can make to adjudication precisely because to describe judging in racial terms
contradicts the "impartiality" and "disinterest" that characterize the traditional idealized view of
judicial decision making. In a forthcoming article, I explore the effect of racial diversity on judicial
decision making. See generally Sherrilyn A. Hill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role
Models and Public Confidence (contending that racially diverse state trial bench will enhance
the quality of judicial decision making) (work in progress on file with the author).
13 See John L. Hill, Jr., Taking Texas Judges Out of Politics: An Argument for Merit Election, 40
BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 359-61 (1988) ("[S]oine ... believe judges' decisions should always reflect
the will of the majority. Should this idea prevail, however, the ideal of an independent judiciary
will disappear."); see also LINN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE
BENCH 132 (1994) (interviewing Federal District Court Judge Constance Baker Motley). Federal
District Court Judge Constance Baker Motley reportedly suggested that while African Americans
and women do not bring perspectives to the judiciary that arc different from those of white men,
African American and female presence on the bench is necessary to build public confidence in
government. See WASHINGTON, supra; Harry T. Edwards, .The Judicial Function and the Elusive
Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837, 837-38 (contrasting "principled deci-
sionmaking," with perception of judicial function "as just one more 'political' enterprise").
14 U.S. CoNs.r. amend. XIV; see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522-23, 531 (1927).
13 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) states that "[a] ny justice, judge,.or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned." 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) (West 1997). The statute includes various instances in which a judge
"shall disqualify himself." See id. § 455(h)-(f). See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 998,
999-1000 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that while personal integrity of a trial judge was not being
questioned, the appearance of fairness and impartiality was best achieved by reassignment of case
to another district judge); Jefferson-El v. Maryland, 622 A.2d 737, 744 (Md. 1993) (holding that
administration of justice, as well as defendant's right to a fair hearing, demanded that the trial
judge recuse himself).
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all-white bench 16 in jurisdictions with significant minority populations. •
The mandate can and should be read to require a structural imparti-
ality of the bench as a whole, in addition to the impartiality of individ-
ual judges." Structural impartiality exists when the judiciary as a whole
is comprised of judges from diverse backgrounds and viewpoints. The
interaction of these diverse viewpoints fosters impartiality by diminish-
ing the possibility that one perspective dominates adjudication. 18 In
effect, judicial impartiality must be realized both individually and struc-
turally.
The analysis in this Article is intentionally focused in two ways.
First, I direct my analysis to racial representation on the state rather
than the federal bench. While I recognize the obvious implications of
this discussion for application to the federal courts, 19 I deem racial
"Throughout this Article, I refer to the all-white bench because in many jurisdictions,
including those with significant minority populations, the bench is all or overwhelmingly white.
The presence of one or two non-white judges on a bench does not change the analysis set out in
this Article. I direct my analysis to jurisdictions with significant minority populations for obvious
reasons. It is in those jurisdictions that racial diversity in legislatures and even in executive offices
has been hard fought and won while the bench remains racially unchanged.
17 1 borrow the terms "individual impartiality mandate" and "structural impartiality" from
Professor Scott Howe in Scott Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory
of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 1173 (1995).
. is 	 Thurgood Marshall reportedly said "Negroes don't have a chance at justice across
the boards when all the judges are white .. .." CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAK-
ERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 283 (1993). The importance of such diversity
in ensuring impartiality has been recognized by the Supreme Court in the context of jury
selection. See, e,g, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504
(1972).
19 The percentage of African American judges serving on federal courts also falls well below
the percentage of African Americans in the general population. Only six percent of the entire
federal bench, including full-time and part•ime magistrates, are African American, See Armmts-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL REPORT FOR JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF TIIE
UNITED STATES (Apr. I, 1997) (supplied to the author on April 15, 1997). For an excellent
discussion of the need for racial diversity on the federal bench, see A. Leon Higginbotham,
Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The American Experience and the South African Challenge, 42
Dula 14 1028 (1993). Judge Higginbotham argues that racial diversity on the federal bench "is
. an important virtue, a sine qua non to building a court that is both substantively excellent
and also respected by the general population." Id. at 1036.
Despite the focus on state courts, Part II of this Article, which examines recusal cases
involving questions of racial bias, relies on federal rather than state cases because I find that the
most thoughtful opinions on this subject have been written by federal judges. Since most states
have adopted nearly identical versions of the federal rccusal standards set out in 28 U,S.C.A,
§§ 144 and 455 (West 1988 & 1997), federal court opinions arc relevant sources. Many state court
judges facing rccusal motions cite the federal cases discussed in this article as authoritative
interpretations of recusal law. See, e,g., American Motor Sales Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 69
Cal. App. 3d 983, 988-90 (Ct. App. 1977); Iowa v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1976);
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comin'n v. School Dist. of Phila., 667 A.2(1 1173, 1177 (Pa.
Conimw. Ct. 1995).
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diversity on state courts to be of paramount importance for several
reasons.
One concern is simply pragmatic: state courts are responsible for
resolving most disputes—civil or criminal. In addition, the tradition of
electing state courts' judges reflects a tradition of state judges exercis-
ing representative functions. Indeed, most states moved from an ap-
pointive to an elective system for judges in the mid-nineteenth century
because they wanted state court judges to be more representative of
the communities they served. Thirty-five states still elect some of their
judges.20 Even those states that appoint their judges require those
judges to face the electorate in periodic retention elections. 2 ' The
continuing existence of judicial selection systems that require direct
citizen participation evidences the desire of most states to connect
explicitly their judges to the communities they serve. 22
Moreover, the recent movement of power from national to state
government has made state government an increasingly important
locus of political power." State judges are enjoying increased power
as the United States Supreme Court limits opportunities for federal
authorities to review or mandate state actions.24
 Increasingly, state
20 Only 21 states appoint all of their trial court judges and only 25 appoint their appellate
court judges. Virtually all of the southern states elect their judges outright. Virtually all slates use
some form of electoral approval for judges, either through direct elections or retention elections.
See DAVID B. ROTFMAN, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 1993 32-43,
48-69 (1995). Nevertheless, I do not view racial representation on the bench as an imperative
only in those jurisdictions where judges are elected rather than appointed. I strongly support the
use of elections for the selection of state judges as the best method of ensuring a meaningful
opportunity to create a diverse, representative judiciary. In a forthcoming article, I describe the
election methods which I believe afford the best opportunity for full and meaningful citizen
participation in the election of judges. See generally 11111, supra note 12.
21 See RoyrmArr, supra note 20, at 32-43, 48-69. In a retention election, voters simply vote
"yes" or "no" to a ballot question that asks whether a particular sitting judge should be "retained"
in office.
22 This is further evidenced by the requirement in most states that elect their judges that
judicial candidates reside in the jurisdiction from which they seek election. See, e.g., CONFERENCE
OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, supra note 7, at 260-70.
"The recent welfare reform bill is one example of this trend. See generally Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996) (to be codified in various sections of the U.S.C.). The bill was signed by President Clinton
on August 23, 1996. See Frances X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; Stales in New Role,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al.
24 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2335, 2337-39 (1996) (upholding aspects of new
federal law restricting federal court habeas review of state court rulings in death penalty cases);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119, 1121, 1131-32, 1133 (1996) (upholding
court of appeals decision barring Native American tribe from suing states in federal court);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
which made possessing a firearm in school zones a federal offense, because it exceeded Congress's
Commerce Clause authority).
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courts will have the final say in determining the rights of their resi-
dents. As governmental decision making at the state level becomes
more important, the role of state courts as part of the fabric of repre-
sentative government should be reexamined."
I also focus my analysis on state trial rather than appellate courts."
State trial courts are the venue where most legal disputes both begin
and end. Most cases disposed of in trial court are not appealed.27 For
many African Americans and other low-income litigants, financial con-
straints often foreclose the possibility of appealing adverse judgments."
Trial court adjudication, therefore, is most often dispositive of the
rights of minority litigants.
Moreover, the absence of minority judges on state trial courts
contributes to an atmosphere of racial exclusion which, at the very
least, marginalizes African American lawyers, litigants and courtroom
personnel in many jurisdictions. Much more destructively, some state
benches operate within a pervasive atmosphere of racial discrimina-
tion. At least twenty states have formed independent commissions to
study the prevalence of race and/or gender bias in the state court
system." The findings of many of these commissions demonstrate that
race and/or gender bias is a common feature within state court sys-
tems." The New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, for
example, concluded that "there are two justice systems at work in the
23 This reexamination may be most urgent in those states where the bench remains racially
homogenous while the legislature becomes more and more racially diverse. In those states, a kind
of political disconnect may occur as the hornogenous judiciary seeks to interpret laws promul-
gated by a more diverse legislature. See Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as
Pouter Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. Rev. 585, 614 (1994) (suggesting that textualism "could dilute the
benefits of increased legislative diversity, as an overwhelmingly white male judiciary imposes its
own assumptions and views on the work product of a multicultural Congress").
"Nevertheless, the percentage of minority judges at the appellate level also reflects gross
underrepresentation. African Americans constituted only 3.8% of state appellate judges in 1986.
See Barbara Luck Graham, supra note 2, at 50 tbl.I (showing distribution of black judges on state
bench by level of court).
27 See, e.g., TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
"As one African American judge has observed, most African Americans "don't have the
money to take their cases to the appellate courts. Therefore, if you're going to get justice, you'd
better get it on the trial court level or else you're not going to get it." WASHINGTON, supra note
13, at 147 (interviewing Judge George W. Crockett, Jr.). But see M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 117 S. Ct. 555,
570 (1996) (holding that Mississippi must waive transcript fee for indigent civil litigant in case
involving termination of parental rights).
29 See WASHINGTON, supra note 13, at xii. The author has cm file 20 reports from such
independent commissions.
"See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. UN RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN
' TIIE COURTS, FAIRNESS IN TIME CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS: A SURVEY or TILE PUBLIC, ATTORNEYS
AND COURT PERSONNEL (July 1993); GEORGIA SUPREME COURT COMM O N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC
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courts of New York State, one for Whites, and a very different one for
minorities and the poor."'
While prosecutors," defense attorneys," police officers," official
courtroom personne135
 and others" share responsibility for contribut-
ing to the existence of bias in the justice system, judges assume a
unique role." Trial judges, in particular, must be held accountable for
racial bias in the justice system because they exercise considerable
direct authority over the other actors in the justice system. Specific
and corroborated incidences of judicial bias in state courts throughout
the country are well-documented. In some instances, judges have en-
gaged in flagrant and extreme racial bias." In particular, commenta-
tors have noted trial judges unequally sentencing similarly situated
African American and white youths; 39
 disproportionately denying bail
to African American offenders; 4° overruling juries' imposition of life
in prison by imposing the death penalty for African American defen-
BIAS IN THE COURT SYSTEM, supra note 5; MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMM., GENDER BIAS IN
TIIE COURTS (May 1989); MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT COMM'N TO STUDY RACIAL
& ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS, EQUAL JUSTICE: ELIMINATING TILE BARRIERS (Sept. 1994).
31
 NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMM'N ON MINORITIES, 1 REPORT 1 (Apr. 1991).
32 See Angela J. Davis, Crime and Punishment: Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal justice
System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1671-74 (1996) (reviewing MICHAEL Tor.ratt, MALIGN NEGLECT:
RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995)).
33 See Statement of George H. Kendall, Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense & Educa-
tional Fund, Inc. to Georgia Supreme Court Comm'n on Racial & Ethnic Bias in the Court System
(Apr. 8, 1994), at 5 (on file with the author) (describing civil rights lawyer's experience with
contract public defender who demonstrated racial bias towards his own clients in capital cases).
34 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE LJ. 214,
214 (1983); Sam Vincent Meddis, Is the Drug War Racist!, USA TODAY, July 23, 1993, at 1A; Greg
Williams, Selective Targeting in Law Enforcement, NAT'L BAR A.SS'N MAG. Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 18,
18-21.
33 See NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMM'N ON MINORITIES, supra note 31, at 22.
36 See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Critics Say Coroner Puts His Morality Before the Facts, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 1996, § 1, at 14 (describing practice of the Spokane County Coroner in Washington State
of designating the death of homosexuals and African American drug-related homicide victims as
suicides).
37
 See infra Part IV.D. Even where judges themselves have not engaged in racist conduct,
judges often contribute to the existence of racism in the courthouse by failing to curb the racist
behavior of other officers of the court. See infra Part IV.D.
38
 See, e.g., NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CONCERNS, FINAL REPORT
41-49 (1992); NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMM'N ON MINORITIES, supra note 31, at 21-23, 87.
39 See MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYS., FINAL
REPORT 101-02 (1993); NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CONCERNS, supra
note 38, at 167-68.
"Anecdotal evidence from lawyers and judges supports the existence of racism in judicial
decision making. In New Jersey, for example, 90.7% of all judges surveyed stated that trial judges'
bail decisions are sometimes influenced by their racial attitudes. See NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT.
TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CONCERNS, supra note 38, at 79.
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dams accused of killing whites; 41 and crediting the testimony of white
witnesses while failing to credit the testimony of comparable African
American witnesses." Judges have regularly failed to pay African Ameri-
can attorneys public respect comparable to white attorneys." Judges
also have made disparaging remarks about racial minorities in open
court and in chambers." The absence of African ArneriCan judges on
most state benches permits such behavior to flourish free from the
inhibiting effect that the mere presence of significant numbers of
minorities can have on these displays of discrimination. In addition, a
racially homogenous bench permits judicial decision making to take
place in the absence of alternative perspectives and viewpoints which
might deepen and enhance the quality of judicial decision making.
Most importantly, trial court decision making, by its very nature,
challenges traditional images of judges as detached, disinterested ex-
perts applying objective standards to dispute resolution. State trial
judges are most often called upon to resolve highly personal, value-
laden disputes." Increasingly, state trial judges are replacing juries in
representing community values. This is particularly true in criminal
matters. 46 Many states permit defendants to waive their right to jury
trials in criminal cases and to have their cases heard by judges.47 In
° Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 760, 765-66 & n.32, 793-94
(1995).
42 See MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYS., Supra
note 39, at 39-42. The absence of significant numbers of African Americans on state court
benches makes it unlikely that African American judges arc responsible for these disparities.
45 See NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMM'N ON MINORITIES, supra note 31, at 22.
" See id. at 21-23 (In one instance, a Commission witness testified that in a Housing Court
nonpayment proceeding, a judge remarked about an African American female professional who
had lost her position with a major university that "maybe she can turn a trick and be able to get
the money she needs."); see also NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CON-
CERNS, supra note 38, at 186 (a judge reportedly told a Hispanic juvenile that he was "genetically
structured to steal cars").
46 For example, in the 38 states that require a minor woman to obtain parental consent or
notification before obtaining an abortion, most provide for a court bypass procedure. See CENTER
FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW & POLICY, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM IN THE STATES: RESTRICTIONS ON
YOUNG WOMEN'S ACCESS TO ABORTION SERVICES (1996). In those states, minor women who do
not wish to involve their parents in their abortion decisions may petition a local judge, who may
grant or deny permission for the abortion procedure in lieu of parental consent. The prevalence
of judicial involvement in such proceedings eiernpliftes the urgency and importance of state trial
courts reflecting the gender and racial diversity of their surrounding communities.
46 See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 19 (1986) (observing that juries
decide only about eight percent of all criminal cases). •
47 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. Pam. Lam § 340.40 (McKinney 1994). Even in cases where the jury
determines guilt or innocence (in criminal matters) or liability (in civil matters), trial judges wield
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some instances, such as capital punishment sentencing, trial judges are
called upon to explicitly express the "community's outrage."45
Trial judges also exercise their decision-making authority in closer
proximity to the dispute•than do appellate judges. Trial judges interact
more frequently with litigants, lawyers and the public through witness
testimony, hearings, in camera settlement discussions and the atten-
dance of the public at trials. Requiring "detachment" and "disinterest"
for judges in these contexts hints at the need for flexibility in describ-
ing the kind of impartiality we seek among judicial decisionmakers. 49
In effect, this Article attempts to juxtapose judicial impartiality as
an ideal against the historical and practical reality of state trial judge
decision making. The results of this examination reveal the breadth of
opportunities for state trial judges to serve a representative function.
The representative nature of the trial judge's role suggests that racial
diversity on the bench should be framed as more than a mere policy
initiative by politicians or bar associations. Instead, racial diversity on
the bench should be promoted as a constitutional imperative. In Part
I of this Article, I review the efforts of minority voters to challenge
the racial homogeneity of the bench in several states by asserting
claims brought under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 5° In
enormous power in determining, through evidentiary rulings, the contours of the case presented
to the jury. See Stephanie Simon & Jim Newton, Simpson Civil Case; News Analysis; Jury Heard
Much Different Case in Civil Trial; Plaintiffs Learned from the Pitfalls of Criminal Proceedin& but
Evidence, Witnesses and the fudge's Rulings Also Set the Second Case Apart, LA. 'nuts, Feb. 5, 1997,
at A15. The O.J. Simpson criminal and civil cases are demonstrative of this point. Superior Court
Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki's stern management of the civil case, as contrasted with the style of
Superior Court Judge Lance Ito, resulted in some evidence being admitted in one trial and
banned in another. See id. (detailing different treatment of evidence by two judges).
18 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 457, 460, 461 (1984) (describing death penalty as an
expression of the "community's outrage," but upholding right of trial judges to impose death
sentence over jury's recommendation of life imprisonment).
49 0f course, federal court judges and state appellate judges also serve a representative
function. They too adjudicate highly personal, value-laden disputes in which they must rely on
community standards to make legal determinations. Federal court judges and state appellate
judges also bring their perspective, experience and values into their decision making. In one
recent unusual case, Federal District Court Judge John Sprizzo acquitted two clergymen of
criminal contempt arising from their activities blocking access to a family planning clinic under
a theory of nullification, See United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 168, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Judge Sprizzo contended that when a judge "sits as a fact-finder, [he has the] ... same prerogative
of leniency" as a jury. Id. at 171.
Nevertheless, for reasons described above, I find issues of judging, representation and
diversity to be of greater urgency for state trial court judges. Moreover, my focus on state trial
judges is strongly informed by my experiences representing African American voters in their
efforts to bring racial diversity to the Texas state trial bench by challenging election schemes that
result in all-white trial courts.
"See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 1997). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the use
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particular, I discuss League of United Latin American Citizens Council
("LULAC") v. Clements, 5 ' in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
initially resisted acknowledging elected state trial judges as "repre-
sentatives" within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act—an interpre-
tation later overturned by the Supreme Court—and expressed deep
concern about the tension between judicial impartiality and the relief
sought by minority voters. Part II explores the impartial judge mandate
of the Fourteenth Amendment as it is currently interpreted. 52 In Part
HI, I argue that the impartial judge mandate has been interpreted too
narrowly and should instead be construed to require both individual
and structural impartiality for judges. 53 Finally, in Part IV, I examine
the role of state judges as representatives. 54 The view of state court
judges expressed by the federal appellate court in LULAC and other
voting rights judges' cases is based on an erroneous and myopic view
of both the historical and current reality of the function of state court
judges. State judges represent through their role as political leaders
and professional role models. More importantly, state trial court judges
are as important as jurors in representing the values of the communi-
ties they serve. State trial judges, like jurors, represent the communities
they serve by reflecting community values in their discretionary deci-
sion making.
I. LULAC V. CLEMENTS AND THE CASES INVOLVING VOTING RIGHTS
IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Beginning in the mid-1980s, African American and other minority
voters in some jurisdictions sought to change the reality of all-white
state trial courts. They challenged the methods used to elect their state
court judges, charging that the election methods violated the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. 55 In particular, these voters contended that the use
of election practices or procedures which deny minority voters an equal opportunity to participate
in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. See id. Plaintiffs challenging an
election mechanism under § 2 of the Act need only prove that in "the totality of circumstances"
the challenged practice results in the diminution of minority voting strength. See Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986). This "results test" requires courts to engage in a "searching
practical evaluation of the 'past and present reality.'" Id. (quoting S. Rap. No. 97-417, at SO
(1982)).
51 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994) [hereinafter LULAC 111.
52 See supra Part II,
55 See supra Part [II.
54
 See supra Part IV.
55 See, e.g., Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1057 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ghisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 276 (6th Cir. 1988); Brooks v. State
Bd. of Elections, 775 F. Supp. 1470, 1472-74 (S.D. Ga. 1989), motion to dismiss granted with
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of at-large elections to select judges diluted the voting strength of racial
minorities and denied them an equal opportunity to elect candidates
of their choice to the bench. 56
 Despite some early successes by minority
litigants in these cases," many of the litigation challenges to judicial
election schemes have ultimately failed." Some cases are still pending. 59
Although the plaintiffs in these Voting Rights Act judges Cases did not
couch their claims for representation in terms of an explicit demand
for structural impartiality, their effort to dismantle discriminatory ju-
dicial electoral methods implicitly questioned the legitimacy of the
all-white bench. In this regard, the Voting Rights Judges Cases sought
to bring structural impartiality to the bench through racial diversity.
prejudice (tune 6, 1997); Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 718 F. Supp. 1324, 1525-26 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
I served as counsel to minority voters challenging discriminatory judicial election schemes
in League of United Latin American Citizens Council ("LULAC, v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994) (challenging the election of trial court judges in nine
counties in Texas); Robinson v. State, No. 91-C-468-B (N.D. Okla. June 10, 1993) (consent decree
filed) (challengitig elections of trial judges in two counties in Oklahoma); and Hoskins V. Hannah,
Civ. Action No. G-92-12 (S.D. Tex. filed Jan. 10, 1992) (consent judgment and election order filed
Aug. 19, 1992) (challenging at-large election of justices of the peace in Galveston County, Texas).
I also served on the trial team in Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1056 (challenging method of electing judges
to Louisiana Supreme Court).
56
 At-large elections can dilute minority voting strength because the electoral district is
comprised of the entire jurisdiction. Where African American voters, for example, constitute a
minority of the voting population, their votes can be diluted by the votes of the larger and
sometimes hostile white electorate. See Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution, in MINORITY
VOTE DnurrioN, supra note 6, at 1-5. The most often utilized remedy to at-large district vote
dilution is the creation of "majority-minority" districts, in which a majority of the voting age
population is comprised of members of a racial minority group.
57
 Since 1987, minority voters have won out-right only one Voting Rights Judges Case. See
Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Sum), 1183, 1204-05 (S.D. Miss. 1987). In six other cases, consent decrees
were entered in favor of minority plaintiffs. See, e.g., Robinson, No. 91-C-468-B, at 1-2, 23; Hunt
v. Arkansas, No. PB-C-89406 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 24, 1992) (consent decree filed 1991); Hoskins, Civ.
Action No. G-92-12; Tsosie v. King, No. CIV 91-0905-M (D.N.M. filed Sept. 9, 1991) (consent
decree filed 1991); Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988), appeal dismissed, 958 F.2d
614 (5th Cir. 1992).
55 See, e.g., Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1283-84
(11th Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996); Davis v. Chiles, No. TCA 90-40098-
MMP (N.D. Fla. July 22, 1996) (unpublished opinion finding at-large elections for Second Judicial
Circuit and Leon County Court does not violate the Voting Rights Act), appeal docketed No.
96-3547 (11th Cir. filed Aug. 21, 1996); Nipper v. Chiles, 795 F. Supp. 1525, 1550 (M.D. Fla. 1992),
rev 'd sub nom. Nipper v. Smith, 1 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g en banc granted,
17 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir.), of 'd, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1083 (1995).
59
 See, e.g., Cousin v. McWhertcr, 904 F. Supp. 686, 713-14 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), appeal docketed
sub nom. Cousin v. Sundquist, No. 96-6028 (6th Cir. July 30, 1996).
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In the paradigmatic and perhaps most contentiously fought of the
"structural" cases—League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements
(hereinafter "LULAC') w—the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the legitimacy and impartiality of an all-white bench in Harris County,
Texas, although forty-two percent of the population of the county was
African American and Mexican American.°' This decision has left in
place a system of selecting judges that virtually precludes meaningful
participation by African American and Mexican American voters."
In LULAC, African American and Mexican American voters chal-
lenged the county-wide system of electing trial judges in the ten most
populous counties in the state as violative of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as amended. The plaintiffs contended that minority
voters were unable to elect candidates of their choice to the bench
because their votes were diluted. Although the trial court ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs, the LULAC case ultimately went before the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals four times and was heard once by the Su-
preme Court. In the first appellate review of the case, LULAC L" a
panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's findings of fact
on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims were inapplicable to elections
for trial judges. The court based its ruling on the fact that trial judges
are autonomous decisionmakers, rather than members of a collegial
decision-making body. As such, the court contended, minority voters
60 999 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
61 Although the suit involved a challenge by Mexican American and African American voters
in nine counties in the state, I represented African American voters in Harris County, the largest
and most populous county in the State of Texas. No claim was advanced on behalf of Mexican
American voters in Harris County. Generally, the references to GULAG evidence in this article
refer to the claims of African American voters in Harris County. Nevertheless, the analysis in this
Article is equally applicable to the exclusion of Mexican Americans, other Latino populations
and Asian Americans from the bench nationwide.
62 The plaintiffs in Harris County determined that African American voters could have
elected at least nine judges of their choice using a majority-minority sub-district electoral scheme.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs advocated the use of an alternative at-large election scheme, which
would remove the dilutive features of the existing system. Cumulative and limited voting, for
example, use at-large structures but provide significant opportunities for minority voters to
participate meaningfully in elections by removing the "winner-take-all" nature of at-large elections
in which 50% plus one members of the electorate can control 100% of the scats. See Pamela S.
Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litiga-
tion, 24 U isv, C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 173, 222 (1989). Both cumulative and limited voting have been
used effectively to cure racial vote dilution. See, e.g., Dillard v. Town of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 1244,
1245 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 871 (M.D. Ala.
1988), affa without opinion sub nom. Dillard v. Chilton County Conini'n, 868 F.2d 1274 (11th
Cir. 1989).
63 902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter "LULAC
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could not seek representation from one autonomous decisionmaker.
The Fifth Circuit, sua sponte, ordered rehearing en banc. A majority
of the en bane court in LULAC IP4
 held that judicial elections—all
judicial elections—are exempt from the Voting Rights Act. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and heard the case, now Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas. 65 The Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit and held that judicial elections are subject to section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.
On remand, a panel of the Fifth Circuit found in favor of the
plaintiffs in LULAC 111.66
 They credited the findings of the district
court that the county-wide election system impermissibly prevented
minority voters from electing judges to the trial bench. Again sua
sponte, the Fifth Circuit ordered rehearing en bane." During the
pendency of briefing and oral argument, the plaintiffs and the State
fashioned a settlement and sought the opportunity to have the case
remanded to the district judge for a fairness hearing on the proposed
consent decree. In LULAC IV, 68 the Fifth Circuit denied the request
for remand and reversed both the panel and the district court deci-
sions. 69
 The en bane court determined that the State of Texas had an
overriding interest in maintaining the impartiality of the bench, that
the county-wide election system promotes that interest and that the
district judge's findings were not supportive of a violation of the Voting
Rights Act. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' writ of certio-
rari. 7°
The county-wide at-large election system had resulted in a nearly
all-white judiciary in the most densely populated counties in Texas,
even where minority voters constituted a significant percentage of the
64 914 F2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), reu'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney
Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991) [hereinafter "LULAC
65
 501 U.S. 419 (1991) [hereinafter 'HLA "J.
66
 986 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter "LULAC III'].
67
 In his dissent to LULAC !IL Judge Patrick Higginbotham—the author of the majority
opinions in LULAC I and LULAC /V—plainly stated, "[tjhe next step must be to vacate the panel
opinion and take this case en bane." Id. at 842 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Higginbotham
attached a 32-page proposed majority opinion as an appendix to his dissent. The majority opinion
in LULAC IV closely mirrored Higginbotham's appendixed "proposed opinion" to LULAC III.
68
 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
6°
 Four justices denounced the refusal of the Fifth Circuit to permit the parties to settle the
case. In particular, they challenged the Fifth Circuit's determination that the Attorney General
of Texas did not have authority to settle the suit because one of the nominal defendants—the
Chiefjustice of the Supreme Court of Texas—was not in favor of the settlement. See id. at 898-900
(Politz, Cj., dissenting). The dissenters described the majority's action as a "headlong rush to
reach the merits" of the case. Id. at 899 (Politz, Cj., dissenting).
7° See LULAC v. Clements, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
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voting population. In Harris County, for example, where African
Americans constituted twelve percent of the total population, only four
African Americans had ever served as district judges in the county
when the minority voters filed their claim. 7 ' The minority voters' claims
in LULAC constituted a demand for participation in the administra-
tion of justice. 72
The trial court's findings of fact amply supported the plaintiffs'
charges of racially discriminatory exclusion." The court found that
African Americans have been historically excluded from the political
process in Texas;74 that voting in state district judge elections in Harris
County is racially polarized;" and that the relatively low number of
minority lawyers "does not explain why well qualified eligible minority
lawyers lose judicial elections." 76 Instead, the court found that of the
seventeen district judge elections in which qualified African American
judicial candidates ran in Harris County between 1980 and 1988, only
two African American candidates were elected." Additionally, the trial
" See Complaint in Intervention at 16a-17a, LULAC, No, 88-CA-154 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 19,
1988) (on file with the author). The lack of racial diversity on the state bench is not simply a
matter of "numbers." Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in these cases sought more than cosmetic
diversity on the bench, of the kind that might be satisfied by the presence of one minority judge.
For example, in LULAC, African American voters anticipated that they could elect a minimum
of nine judicial candidates of their choice if the existing election system were altered, See LULAC,
No. MO-88-CA-154, slip op. at 15 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 1989) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
"Slip Op. at ".] The significance of this change might have affected more than just the
appearance of diversity. Judicial decision making might have been impacted as well. Empirical
studies have shown that "Rifle larger the numbers, the greater the likelihood that previously
excluded groups will perform well, both in terms of traditional achievement and in their ability
to innovate." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making
New Voices in the Law, 42 MIAMI L. REv. 29, 43-44 & n.72 (1987); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Micu. L. kali. 1611, 1698 & nn.466-467 (1985) (citing
studies showing that at least three minority jurors are needed on a jury panel to overcome the
group pressure of the majority). In cases wheie minority voters' claims were settled, the increase
in the number of minority judges elected following implementation of a remedial plan was
startling. in Louisiana, 41 new African American trial judges had been elected as a result of the
Clark u Edwards case which challenged and successfully changed the way trial judges were elected.
See Attorney: Challenge to Process of Picking Judges is Frivolous, Am. PRESS, June 5, 1996, at B2.
Pursuant to Hunt v. Arkansas, eight new African American trial judges were elected. See. Interview
with Arkic Byrd, Plaintiffs Attorney, May 10, 1996 (on file with the author).
72 They contended that electing judges from majority-minority sub-districts within the county
would afford African American voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to serve
as district judges. See Complaint in InterventiOn at 19a-20a, LULA C, No. 88-CA-154.
73 The district court's ruling was entered in favor of the minority plaintiffs in each of the
nine counties challenged in the lawsuit. See Slip Op. at 92.
"See id. at 69-71.
76 See id. at 29-30.
76 1d. at 75.
77 See id. at 73.
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court found that the reasons offered by the State for continuing the
use of at-large elections for district judges were not compelling. 18 In
sum, the district court found that in the "totality of circumstances,"
minority voters were denied an equal opportunity to participate in the
election of judges to the Texas trial bench.
Yet, over the course of the four appellate decisions," the Fifth
Circuit articulated three principal reasons why the minority voters'
claims in LULAC had to fail, each bearing on the role of judges as
representatives and as impartial decisionmakers: ( 1) judges are not
representatives and therefore the election of judges cannot be chal-
lenged under the Voting Rights Act; 8 ' (2) even if judges are repre-
sentatives for purposes of the Voting Rights Act, it is impossible to
obtain representation from trial judges because they decide cases in-
dependently;82
 and (3) altering the at-large method of electing judges
to give minority voters a meaningful opportunity to elect judges of
their choice from judicial sub-districts would undermine the imparti-
ality of the judiciary."
The appellate court in LULAC was initially most troubled by the
plaintiffs' implicit claim that elected trial judges are "representatives"
as that term is used in the Voting Rights Act. In LULAC II, the court
offered two possible reasons why the plaintiffs' attempt to be repre-
sented on the trial bench should fail. A majority of judges on the court
78 See Slip Op. at 77. At trial, the State offered three reasons for continuing the use of at-large
elections: "(1) judges elected from smaller districts would be more susceptible to undue influence
by organized crime; (2) changes in the current system would result in costly administrative
changes for district clerk's offices; and (3) the system of specialized courts in some counties would
disenfranchise all voters' rights to elect judges with jurisdiction over some matters." Id. at 76. The
threat to impartiality argument was developed further by the Fifth Circuit on appeal in LULAC
and thereafter assumed primary importance among the State's appellate arguments. See 902
F.2d at 293.
79 1n order to assess claims under the "totality of circumstances," courts are guided by a list
of objective factors set out in the Senate Report which accompanied passage
 of the 1982 amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S,C.CA.N: 177, 206-07. The Senate Report is recognized as the authoritative source for
interpreting amended section 2. See, e.g., Thornburg v. tingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986).
80 See LULAC N, 999 F.2d at 831; LULAC III, 986 F.2d at 728; LULAC II, 914 F.2d at 620;
LULAC I, 902 F.2d at 293.
81 See generally LULAC II, 914 F.2d at 620; LULAC I, 902 F.2d at 293. LULAC II was struck
down by the United States Supreme Court in HLA. See generally 501 U.S. at 419.
82
 This interpretation was also struck down by HLA. See 501 U.S. at 425-28.
83 This holding survived all four LULAC decisions. In its final LULAC decision, the Fifth
Circuit also reversed the district court's finding that voting in judicial elections was racially
polarized and found instead that political party affiliation controlled judicial election outcomes
in Harris County. See LULAC IV, 999 F.2d at 855. Racially polarized voting is "the linchpin" of a
claim brought under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City
of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1987).
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held that the Voting Rights Act could not be used to challenge judicial
elections because judges "serve[] no representative function whatever:
the judge represents no one."" At the same time, the majority did find
that judges "speak for and to the entire community, [but] never for
segments of it . . . ."85 Five judges concurred in a position articulated
by Judge Patrick Higginbotham86 that plaintiffs could not seek repre-
sentation on the trial bench because each trial judge "acts alone in
wielding judicial power" and as such cannot serve a representative
function.° Minority voters can only seek representation from officials
who serve on a multi-member body. 88 Although Judge Higginbotham
conceded that judges serve some representative functions, he con-
cluded, like the majority, that judges cannot represent "a specific
constituency" in the community.°
Although the Supreme Court ruled in the minority plaintiffs'
favor that elected judges are representatives for the purposes of the
Voting Rights Act,9° on remand, the Fifth Circuit ultimately denied
plaintiffs' claims on two grounds: that plaintiffs had failed to demon-
strate that voting in district judge elections is racially polarized and that
the plaintiffs' attempt to obtain representation on the trial bench
84 LULAC II, 914 F.2(1 at 625.
88 Id. at 628.
88 Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals authored most of the
LULAC opinions I discuss herein.
87 LULAC II, 914 F.2d at 648.
88 In "traditional" voting rights cases, minority voters challenge the at-large method of elect-
ing representatives to a multi-member legislative body, such as a city council. In those cases,
minority voters typically seek to change the election system to a single-member district system
that would enable a politically cohesive, geographically compact community of African Americans
to numerically dominate at least one district and elect a candidate of their choice to sit on the
council. Thus, minority voters sought "a seat at the table." See Lani Guilder, No Two Seats: The
Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. Rev. 1413, 1415-16 (1991) (describing the traditional
voting rights representation model as "the right [of minority representatives) to be 'present"'
when "the majority acts"). In LULAC, plaintiffs challenged the method of electing trial judges
who do not, for the most part, exercise their authority as part of a multi-member decision-making
body. Judge Higginbotham borrowed from the Second Circuit's analysis in Butts v. City of New
York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986), ha which that court struck
down a minority plaintiff's challenge to the use of run-off elections for primaries for the mayor,
city council president and comptroller. In that case, the court held "RI here can be no equal
opportunity for representation within an office filled by one person." Id. at 148. In HLA, the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that "the 'single-member office' theory automatically exempts
certain elections from the coverage of § 2." 501 U.S. at 426. This decision would have left in place
an earlier Fifth Circuit panel decision upholding the application of section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to the election of appellate court judges. See Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1064 (5th
Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
89 See LULAC II, 914 F.2d at 636.
98 See HLA, 501 U.S. at 421; Chisotn v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383 (1991).
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would undermine "the fact and appearance of judicial fairness" by
creating the perception that judges would exercise "bias and favoritism
towards the parochial interests of a narrow constituency."°' This pre-
diction of judicial bias in LULAC /Vnarrowed the Fifth Circuit's earlier
assessment of the plaintiffs' goals as seeking "to simply allocate judges,
and thus judicial decisions, among various population groups." 92
Other courts following LULAC have turned back minority voter
claims based, in part, on the impartiality concern. In Nipper v. Smith,
for example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on LULAC,
held that the creation of majority African American sub-districts for
the election of judges "would be detrimental to [the] pattern of fair
and impartial justice."93
II. INDIVIDUAL IMPARTIALITY AND MINORITY JUDGES
A. The Due Process Impartial Judge Mandate
The Fifth Circuit's concerns about the ability to maintain impar-
tiality among judges who are explicitly elected by a particular racial
constituency in the community suggests that the individual impartiality
of judges would be compromised by their representative role. Such
a conflict would arguably violate an individual litigant's Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process right to an impartial judge. Yet, individual
judicial bias cannot be assumed merely by the fact that a judge could
feel beholden to a certain segment of the electorate." Instead, bias
must be alleged against an individual judge based on specific facts.
The Supreme Court's decision in Tumey v. Ohio" firmly estab-
lished that a defendant cannot be tried before a judge who has a
"direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the
case.96 Due process requires not only the absence of actual interest by
the trier, but also the absence of any appearance of interest. As the
Supreme Court has held, "justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice."97 A judge who cannot satisfy both the fact and appearance of
impartiality must be disqualified from hearing the case at issue.
91 LULAC IV, 999 F.2d at 869.
92 LULAC a 914 F.2d at 649.
93 39 F.Sd 1494, 1544 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
94 To assume bias in such a manner would have led inevitably to the conclusion that individ-
ual white judges on the bench in Harris County arc biased in favor of the white electorate
responsible fOr their judicial success.
95 273 U.S. 510 (1927),
96 Id. at 523.
97 See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. II, 14 (1954).
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The principal means of ensuring individual judicial impartiality is
judicial disqualification, which permits litigants to seek removal of a
judge who may be biased from hearing a particular case. Most states
and the District of Columbia have adopted the disqualification stand-
ards of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the "Code") •s The
standard is an objective one, requiring the judge to recuse himself if
his "impartiality might reasonably, be questioned . . . . "99 The Code also
identifies specific circumstances involving judicial bias which require
disqualification, including a judge's knowledge of factual issues in a
case, or a judge's economic interest in the outcome of a case)c*
A federal judge may also sua sponte withdraw from a case in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 455 ("section 455"). Section 455 was
amended in 1972 to incorporate an objective standard identical to that
of the Code." Thus, under amended section 455, a judge is to with-
draw from any proceeding "in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned." 1)2 This standard requires recusal when "a reasonable,
objective person, knowing all of the circumstances, would have ques-
tioned the judge's impartiality."' 03 The amended section 455 also sets
out several specific circumstances in which a judge must disqualify
himself from hearing a case."
98 STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 563 (4th
ed. 1995).
"MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (1) (1990).
10° The federal system provides two avenues for judicial disqualification from a case. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 144 and 455 provide the mechanism for judicial disqualification. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144, 455
(West 1988 & 1997). Section 144 requires that a judge be disqualified from a case whenever
party submits an application which alleges with sufficiency that the judge "has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party." 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988). The judge
against whom a § 144 motion and affidavit have been filed can pass on the sufficiency of the
affidavit. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 30, 32-36 (1921), The facts alleged in the
affidavit are taken to be true. See id. at 32-34. However, mere conclusory allegations are in-
sufficient to warrant rccusal. Instead, the party seeking recusal must allege specific facts showing
"a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment." Id. at 35-34.
101 28 U.S.C. § 455 had originally used a subjective standard, requiring a judge to recuse
himself from a proceeding if "in his opinion" his participation would be improper. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (1970) (amended 1972).
I" See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994).
1 °3 Hughes v. United States, 899 F.2d 1495, 1501 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990).
I04 These standards also mirror the specific circumstances set out in the Code which relate
to personal bias, financial interest and prior involvement with a case as a lawyer. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b). Because the federal statutory standard now mirrors the Code standard adopted by most
states, the federal rccusal cases have proven highly instructive to state courts in interpreting
mensal standards. See supra note 17.
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B. Lessons From the Race-Recusal Cases
In LULAC, the Fifth Circuit initially rejected the minority voters'
structural bias claims in part by advancing an individual impartiality
analysis. 16
 In essence, , the court expressed concern that minority
judges elected by minority voters would be biased in favor of their
constituents, suggesting that in individual cases such judges would not
act impartially. The Fifth Circuit's assumptions about the ability of
African American judges to be racially "impartial" is not new or un-
usual. Recusal based upon the question of individual judicial imparti-
ality and the race of the judge has been raised with frequency in
"race-recusal" cases. 1 °6
 These are cases in which white litigants have
sought to disqualify African American judges in cases in which racial
discrimination is an issue. The claims of bias asserted by white litigants
in these recusal cases have compelled African American judges to
question and challenge a racially-constructed definition of "impartial-
ity." As a result of these cases and the opinions written by African
American judges, it is now well-settled that a judge's impartiality is not
called into question simply by virtue of the shared racial identity of the
judge and the litigant.
In the landmark "race
-recusal" case, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
v. Local Union 5442, 107
 Judge A. Leon Higginbothamm rejected the
efforts of a defendant contractors' union to disqualify him from adju-
dicating the claims of African American union members who charged
that the union discriminated against them.m° The union based its
challenge on a speech Judge Higginbotham made before a group of
African American historians."° In this non-jury case, the union based
their recusal motion on the fact that Judge Higginbotham was African
American, that the case would be a bench trial and that Judge Higgin-
05
 See LULAC I, 902 F.2d 293,296 (5th Cir. 1990).
1 °6 See, e.g., LeRoy v. City of Houston, 592 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Tex.), mandamus denied, In re
City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1984); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local Union
5442,388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa.'1974).
107 388 F. Supp. at 155.
m References in this section to Judge Higginbotham refer to Judge A. Leon Higginbotham,
jr., former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Higginbotham, a noted
scholar on the history of racism in the United States, left the bench in 1993 and is no relation
to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, the author of the LULAC opinions.
109 See 388 F. Supp. at 156-57.
HO See id. at 159-60. The union's challenge was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, which
upon the motion of one of the parties requires a judge to recuse himself if the affidavit accom-
panying the recusal motion alleges with sufficiency that the judge has a "personal bias or
prejudice" in favor of or against a party. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994).
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botham had used the word "we" in describing African Americans
during his speech.'"
Judge Higginbotham firmly denied the existence of a conflict
between impartiality and African American judges' expression of soli-
darity with their community. He rejected a definition of impartiality in
which "white judges will be permitted to keep the latitude they have
enjoyed for centuries in discussing matters of intellectual substance
." while denying the same latitude to African American judges. 112 He
identified and rejected the defendants' claim that "the impartiality of
a black judge can be assured only if he disavows, or does not discuss
the legitimacy of blacks' aspirations to full first-class citizenship in their
own native land." Thus, Judge Higginbotham not only asserted the
generalized right of African American judges to be free from suspicion
of impartiality based on race, he also insisted on the right of African
American judges to openly and affirmatively demonstrate their support
for minority civil rights and to embrace cultural connections with the
African American community. In a prophetic conclusion, Judge Hig-
ginbotham predicted that "[white] litigants are going to have to accept
the new day where the judiciary will not be entirely white and where
some black judges will adjudicate cases involving race relations. """
Other African American judges have found themselves under
similar attack in race-recusal cases. Some of the recusal motions in
these cases have focused on the judges' background as civil rights
"The defendants' affidavit in support of rccusal also alleged:
5. (judge Higginbotham's use of] the pronoun "we" ... evidences [his] "intimate
tie with and emotional attachment to the advancement of black civil rights";
6. That by [his] agreement to deliver the speech [he] presented [himself] as "a
leader in the future course of the black civil rights movement";
7. That [his] speech took place in "an extra-judicial and community context," and
not in the course of this litigation;
11. That [he] believe [s] "that there has been social injustice to blacks in the United
States"; . . . and "that they must be remedied by extra-judicial efforts by blacks,
including [himself]';
15. That "in view of the applicable federal law," and by reason of [his] "personal
and emotional commitments to civil rights causes of the black community, the black
community expectation as to [his] leadership and spokesmanship therein, and the
basic tenet of our legal system requiring both actual and apparent impartiality in
the federal courts," [his] "continuation ... as trier of fact, molder of remedy and
arbiter of all issues constitutes judicial impropriety."
Local 5442, 389 F. Supp. at 157-58.
"2 1d. at 165.
" 3 1d. at 178.
" 4 /d. at 177.
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lawyers or on the judges' acquaintance with African American defen-
dants. At their core, however, these recusal motions challenge the
ability of African American judges to behave with impartiality.
For example, African American female judge Constance Baker
Motley was the subject of a recusal motion filed by a defendant law
firm in a case in which a female lawyer was suing the law firm for
gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1.964. 16
Judge Motley rejected the defendants' challenge to her impartiality,
making the now classic observation:
if background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition,
sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could
hear this case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that all of
them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law
firm or public service backgrounds." 6
In some instances, recusal motions painstakingly attempt to avoid
openly challenging the judge based on his or her race, while at the
same time identifying clear racial proxies. In almost all instances, these
racial proxies apply disproportionately to African American judges. For
example, in Baker v. City of Detroit," 7 white police officers challenging
the promotion polices of the Detroit Police Department sought to
recuse African American judge Damon Keith, ostensibly because he
was an acquaintance of one of the nominal defendants, African Ameri-
can Mayor Coleman Young. In rejecting the recusal motion, Judge
Keith remarked:
The reality of life is that only a small number of Black persons
have been elevated to positions of responsibility in our na-
tional life. It therefore is highly likely, especially in a predomi-
nantly Black city like Detroit, that a Black Federal Judge
would know, on a friendship basis, a Black Mayor." 8
Judge Keith identifies the true basis of the recusal motion as prem-
ised not on his acquaintance with Mayor Young, but rather on his
race:
The conclusion is inescapable that the likely grounds upon
which plaintiffs' motion is based is the fact that I am Black,
that Mayor Young is Black, that this action was brought by
"8 See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
116 7d. at 4.
" 458 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
118 1d. at 377.
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white policemen seeking to challenge the affirmative action
program in the Detroit Police Department. . . . 119
In LeRoy v. City of Houston,' 2° African American judge Gabrielle
McDonald denied a recusal motion on similar grounds. In that case,
white defendants in a voting rights case sought to recuse Judge McDon-
ald purportedly because she was a member of the putative class in a
Rule 23(b) (2) class seeking injunctive rclief.' 2 ' The proposed class was
composed of African American voters in the City of Houston. The
defendants sought Judge McDonald's recusal even though the class
had never been certified, Judge McDonald was not a registered voter,
and at the time of the suit, Judge McDonald did not reside in the
African American populated areas of the city that potentially would be
fashioned into majority-minority districts if the plaintiffs prevailed.
Judge McDonald questioned the true underlying grounds for the de-
fendants' recusal motion, remarking: "I find it curious that my race
was not alleged to be a basis for recusal in the City's Motion.... [T] he
City seemingly chose not to assert directly and forthrightly what has
come to be the real basis for its Motion To Recuse."'"
Judge McDonald faced yet another race-based recusal motion in
Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan when the
Ku Klux Klan cited Judge McDonald's former employment as an assis-
tant counsel at the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund and at
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") as evi-
dence of her bias. 12" The defendants,also alleged that Judge McDon-
ald's bias was revealed when she asked the plaintiffs whether they
would feel intimidated if the defendants wore their Klan robes to
depositions. Finally, the defendants alleged their belief that African
Americans are "prejudiced against the Ku Klux Klan. 1,124
112 1d.
122 592 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Tex.), mandamus denied, In re City of Houston, 745 F2d 925 (5th
Cir. 1984).
121 See id. at 416-18.
122 Id. at 420 n.12. Judge McDonald ultimately denied the motion, holding that her interest
in the outcome of the suit was "marginal and temporary" since she neither was a registered voter
nor lived in the proposed majority African American electoral district. See id. at 422-24.
"3 518 F. Supp. 1017, 1018 & n.1 (S.D. Tex, 1981). In fact, Judge McDonald had never worked
for the EEOC and had only worked at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for two years following
graduation from law school. See id.
1 " See id. at 1019. Ironically, after leaving the bench to return to private practice, Judge
McDonald served with me as co-counsel for the Houston Lawyers' Association in LULA C. judge
McDonald now serves on the International Court of Justice presiding over war crimes cases in
Bosnia.
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These recusal cases demonstrate the pervasiveness of what Judge
Higginbotham in Local 5442 described as "an inherent disquietude"
of some white litigants to accept African American trial judges as
autonomous legal decisionmakers' 25
 in cases where race is at issue.' 26
By seeking the recusal of African American judges based on the ap-
pearance of bias, these litigants suggest that true impartiality can be
exercised only by white male judges. 127
Although Judge Higginbotham and other African American
judges have firmly and decisively answered impartiality allegations in
race-recusal cases, barriers still exist to the full acceptance of African
American judges. African American judges are still expected to pass a
"race test" to prove their impartiality.'" Concern about the impartiality
of African American judges regularly finds expression in the judicial
selection forum. The appointment or election of African American
judges is viewed with suspicion and often seen as a response to narrow,
parochial interests rather than as benefitting the judicial system as a
whole. 12" So, for example, Judge Patrick Higginbotham expressed his
concern in LULAC that the impartiality of the Texas bench would be
125 In this sense, the impartiality of African American trial judges may be subject to greater
challenge because of their autonomous decision-making function. African American appellate
judges will generally serve on panels dominated by white judges where minority views may be
"balanced" or "screened" by white judges.
126 See Local 5442, 388 F. Supp. at 177.
127 See id.
128
 In a recent editorial in the Jackson, Mississippi NORTHSIDE SUN, the publisher of the
paper, Wyatt Emmerich, conducted an informal poll concerning the state's sitting Supreme Court
Justices. Emmerich asked "six attorney . . friends to assess the nine judges" on the bench.
Emmerich described the state's only African American Supreme Court judge, Fred Banks, as
smart, intellectual, professional and personally impressive. But Emmerich concluded that Judge
Banks' "past experience with the NAACP makes him very pro-black on racial issues." Emmerich
then quoted a source who claimed that Judge Banks "is intelligent and knows the law but he
occasionally flunks the race test." (emphasis added). Judge Banks is never described as African
American in the article. See Wyatt Emmerich, Attorneys Rate the Supreme Court Judges, NounismE
SuN, Apr. 18, 1996, at 4A.
122 1n a recent editorial in the BALTIMORE SUN, editors expressed concern that Maryland
Governor Parris Glendening would seek to satisfy African American interest groups by elevating
sitting Court of Appeals Judge Robert Bell to ChiefJudge. See Editorial, Glendening's Big Judicial
Appointment, BALTIMORE SUN, June 17, 1996, at 8A. The Court of Appeals is the highest court in
the State of Maryland. Despite earlier news articles in the same paper describing Judge Bell as a
highly-qualified candidate with an impeccable professional background, and as a well-respected
jurist among both his colleagues on the bench and the legal community at large, the SUN editors
cautioned the Governor against taking "the political route on this appointment" by appointing
a Chief Judge who will satisfy the two groups that are important to [the Governor] . women
and blacks." Id. The editors had also cautioned the Governor against elevating Irma Raker, the
only woman Court of Appeals Judge to Chief. See id. Judge Raker had been recently appointed
to the Court of Appeals. Instead, the editors suggested that the Governor "needs to find the
best-qualified candidate to run Maryland's court system. Period." Id. Several days later the
Governor announced that he was broadening his search for a Chief Judge to include candidates
who were not already on the bench. All of the non-judge candidates mentioned in the article as
December 1997) 	 RACE AM) THE JUDICIARY	 119
compromised by changing the trial court election system so that Afri-
, can American voters could elect judicial candidates of their choice.' 3°
This fear reflects continuing and widespread discomfort with minority
judges and impartiality.
III. A RACIALLY DIVERSE TRIAL BENCH—THE CASE FOR STRUCTURAL
IMPARTIALITY
The plaintiffs' claims in LULAO 3' and the other Voting Rights
Judges Cases reflected an effort to achieve structural impartiality on
the trial bench. The impartiality the plaintiffs sought was not directed
to the individual bias of particular judges, but rather to the structural
impartiality of the entire judiciary. For the LULAC claimants, structural
impartiality is realized through the interaction of diverse viewpoints on
the bench and the resulting decreased opportunity for one perspective
to consistently dominate judicial decision making. As such, racial di-
versity on the bench would promote, rather than undermine, imparti-
ality.
Many highly-regarded judges have observed that judicial decision
making is most effective, conscious and representative when it is in-
formed by the variety of perspectives and qualities that racial diversity
necessarily brings to the bench.'" Such has been realized by some
members of the Supreme Court through the diverse and unique con-
tributions of Justice Thurgood Marshall. As Justice Sandra Day O'Con-
nor has written of Justice Marshall:
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal
histories and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special
perspective. . . Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal
acumen but also his life experiences, constantly pushing and
prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal
argument but also to the power of moral truth.'"
being considered for Chieffudge were white men. Seefane Bowling, Will Chieffudge 13e Outsider?,
DAILY RECORD, Julie 20, 1996, at 1. Nevertheless, Judge Bell was later elevated to Chief Justice.
1 " See LULAC 1, 902 F.2d at 296.
131 LULAC IV, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
132 See Higginbotham, supra note 19, at 1035-41; Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall:
The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992) (In a tribute to Justice Marshall,
Justice O'Connor speaks of the unique and "special perspective" Justice Marshall brought to the
Court.); Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1215
(1992) (remembering Justice Marshall's contribution in bringing to the "conference table years
of experience in an area that was of vital importance to our work, experience that none of us
could claim to match"),
133
 O'Connor, supra note 132, at 1217; see BARBARA A. PERRY, A 'REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME
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The interaction of these perspectives also yields another return—
greater impartiality.
A. The Analogy to Jury Impartiality
The link between diversity and impartiality has been recognized
by the Supreme Court in its jury venire selection cases. Diversity pro-
motes impartiality by ensuring that no one viewpoint, perspective or
set of values can persistently dominate legal decision making. Diversity
then functions as a check on bias. In the jury venire cases, the Supreme
Court has held that structural impartiality on the jury venire is com-
pelled by both the Fourteenth Amendment and Sixth Amendment jury
impartiality requirements.' 34
 According to the Supreme Court, the
right to an impartial jury includes not only the right of the litigants
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment 135 to
be free from individual bias of jurors, but also the right to select juries
from a pool that is representative of the community. 136
 Jury venires,
therefore, should reflect a "fair cross-section of the community." 13"
The fair cross-section requirement serves the dual purpose of
promoting both the representative nature and the impartiality of the
jury. Impartiality, according to the Supreme Court, is best assured
COURT?: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS 137-38 (1991) (citing
an interview with Justice Powell in which he argued that diversifying the bench with previously
excluded groups can bring new insights to the court, and noting how Justice Marshall's "unique
contribution" to the court derived from Marshall's "direct experience with racial segregation in
this country").
134 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (stating that "due process alone has long
demanded that, if a jury is to be provided to the defendant, regardless of whether the Sixth
Amendment requires it, the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded
by the Sixth Amendment").
M lle Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant "the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added).
IsH Individual impartiality ensures the litigant's right to face a jury in which each juror is
unbiased and free from pre-trial prejudices toward the defendant. Like judges, who must be
disqualified from hearing cases in which they have an interest, so the Due Process Clause permits
the defendant to remove for cause those jurors who evidence a bias against the defendant. See
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1975) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment's provi-
sion for jury impartiality is made binding on the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
137 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 524, 528 (1968) (Douglas, j., writing separately)
(citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299-300 (1947) (Murphy, j., dissenting) in that "there is a
constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group which represents a cross-section of the commu-
nity. And a cross-section of the community includes persons with varying degrees of training and
intelligence and with varying economic and social positions. . It is a democratic institution,
representative of all qualified classes of people.").
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when the jury selection system ensures that diverse viewpoints have an
opportunity to interact in juror deliberations.t"s To increase the likeli-
hood that this balanced exchange of viewpoints will occur in jury
deliberations, petit juries should be selected from a diverse group of
potential jurors in the venire. Group-based exclusion from the jury
venire is sufficient to establish a prima facie showing that the jury is
biased." Conversely, bias is implicitly defined by the Court as the
absence of diversity. In Peters v. Kiff' 4° for example, the Court struck
down the conviction of a white defendant in a criminal case in which
African Americans had been excluded from the jury pool. Writing for
the majority, Justice Marshall explained: "When any large and iden-
tifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the
effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable." 141
The Supreme Court has identified the exclusion of African Ameri-
cans, Mexican Americans and women from the jury venire as damaging
to the impartiality of the jury venire. 192 In finding that the exclusion
of these groups imperils jury impartiality, the Court has not ascribed
to those groups a particular ideology, nor has it required proof that
members of these groups will cast their jury votes in a certain way.
Instead, the Court has reasoned implicitly in these cases that race (and
gender) can serve as proxies for diversity of perspective.' 4s It may also
be true that the alternative perspectives that racial minorities can
potentially bring to legal decision making are not limited solely to
those informed by race. Given the subordinated role of racial minori-
ties in the social, economic and political life of our country, increasing
racial diversity among legal decisionmakers may also result in the
inclusion of additional alternative perspectives reflective of other kinds
1"1-lans & Vidmar have suggested that Ibliases for and against the defendant, if evenly
distributed on the jury, may cancel each other out." HANS & Winona, supra note 46, at 50. •
1 " See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31 ("The broad representative character of the jury should be
maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.") (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, j., dissenting)).
149 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
141 Id. at 503.
" 2 See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 524-25, 538 (holding that exclusion of women from jury
service results in jury pools that arc not reasonably representative of the community and denies
due process to criininal defendant).
145 See id. at 531 ("[W]oinen are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men and that if they
are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section require-
ment cannot be satisfied.").
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of subordination—such as class and/or economic subordination—
which often are closely aligned with racial subordination.'"
B. Applying the Jury Impartiality Argument
Can structural impartiality on judicial benches be constitutionally
compelled? Although the Supreme Court has most often described the
mandate for structural impartiality of juries as derived from the Sixth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Fourteenth
Amendment also compels structural impartiality on jury venires.'" If
the Court reads the Fourteenth Amendment to compel independently
the full measure of impartiality described in the Sixth Amendment,
then so too should the Fourteenth Amendment require such imparti-
ality for judges. A racially homogenous bench carries with it all of the
dangers of a racially exclusive jury venire.'"
A Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the racial homogeneity of
the bench could be made using similar evidence as that offered in the
jury venire cases. Such a hypothetical case would challenge as racially
discriminatory the system used to select judges for the bench. Model-
ling the jury cases, plaintiffs could make out a prima facie case of
discrimination in, judicial selection cases by proving three elements.
First, in accordance with the test set for juror impartiality in Duren v.
Missouri, 147
 a racially homogenous bench would fail the impartiality test
if the plaintiffs proved that the racial group excluded is a distinct
group. Second, the plaintiffs need to show that the under-repre-
sentation of this group on the bench is unreasonable given the pres-
ence of that group in the community. 18
 To satisfy this prong, the
plaintiffs could show that African Americans have not served as judges
over an extended period of time.'" Finally, the plaintiffs would have
I44 See, e.g., Thomas G. Walker & Deborah .). Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 jovuxiti. or POLITICS, 596, 598 (1985) (finding that President
Carter's African American and female federal judicial appointees "were younger, less affluent and
lower on measures of localism than the traditional white male candidates for the bench"); see also
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race
-Consciousness, 91 CoLum. L. REV. 1060, 1086 (1991).
Aleinikoff persuasively argues that "recognition of a nonmajority presence may also provide
important perspectives on matters not generally associated with race" because minority perspec-
tives help us critique and understand the culture of domination in general.
"5 See, e.g., Morgan v, Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (indicating that due process compels
structural impartiality on jury venires).
"6 See Higkinbotham, supra note 19, at 1036 ("More often than not, judicial homogeneity
and exclusivity are deterrents to, rather than promoters of, equal justice for all.").
147 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
148
 See id. at 369.
149 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 484, 494, 500 (1977) ("key-man" grand jury
selection system struck down for excluding Mexican Americans).
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to prove that the severe under-representation on the bench was caused
by the systematic exclusion of minority candidates from the judicial
selection process. In Harris County, for example, an African American
plaintiff could offer similar evidence to that offered in LULAC--
namely that race was the primary determinant of district judge elec-
tions. 15° In addition, our hypothetical plaintiff could demonstrate the
effect of the at-large judicial election system on the ability of minority
candidates to campaign successfully, obtain vital endorsements and win
district judge elections.
Like the juror impartiality test, this Fourteenth Amendment test
would be less burdensome than the stringent requirements set out for
plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis' 5 ' and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Cotp.' 52 Instead, the judicial imparti-
ality inquiry, like that for jury venire selection, would fall within the
Yick Wo v. Hopkinsm category of cases, in which the extent of the
impact creates an inference of purposeful discrimination. Indeed, Ar-
lington Heights suggests that evidence supporting discrimination in the
selection of the jury venire need not even rise to the level of the
disparity found in Yick Wo.'m Instead, stark disparities between the level
of racial minorities in the community and those serving on the venire
could support a prima facie case.' 55 Similar evidence of racial disparities
155 At trial, the plaintiffs demonstrated, ultimately unsuccessfully, that race was the primary
determinant of the outcome of district judge elections in Harris County. Not even political party
affiliation affected the ability of minority candidates to be elected. Instead, a gross disparity existed
between the success rates of white and African American judicial candidates. For example,
between 1980 and 1988, 52% of white Democratic candidates won contested district judge
elections, while only 12.5% of African American Democratic candidates enjoyed similar success.
Set Trial Transcript at 4-60, LULAC, MO-88—CA-154 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 1989) (on file with
the author).
151 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that evidence of racially disparate impact of District of
Columbia police hiring policy practices was insufficient to support claim of equal protection
violation).
152 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (setting out circumstantial and direct evidence relevant to proof of
intentional discrimination in violation of Equal Protection Clause).
155 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, the disproportionate impact on Chinese laundries of a
facially neutral statute was sufficient to support a finding of intentional racial discrimination in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 361-63, 374.
154 In Arlington Heights, the Court suggested a prima facie case of discrimination in jury
selection could be supported "even when the statistical pattern does not approach the extremes
of Yick Wo." 429 U.S. at 266 n.13. Similarly, in Washington v. Davis, the Court suggested that "in
the selection of juries ... the systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an 'unequal applications
of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination.'" 426 U.S. at 241 (quoting Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398, 404 (1945)). For a more detailed discussion of the Yick Wo standard as applied to
jury-selection cases, see Johnson, supra note 71, at 1684-85.
155 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
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on the bench would suffice to support the plaintiffs' prima facie cases
involving judicial elections.
At this point, the burden would shift to the state to provide a
legitimate reason for the exclusion of minorities from the bench. This
inquiry would require the state to do more than make mere general
assertions of nondiscrimination. 156 Unlike in LULAC, the state's
justification for the use of its system must be proven rather than
assumed. The tradition of using an at-large system for electing judges
would not satisfy the defendant's burden. Nor would the Fifth Circuit's
unproven impartiality concern overcome the plaintiffs' interest in
structural impartiality. Rather, the state would have to demonstrate
"that a significant State interest [will] be manifestly and primarily
advanced" by the challenged system.' 67 Most importantly, using a Four-
teenth Amendment challenge based on the jury venire model, the
plaintiffs' interest in structural impartiality on the bench would be
explicitly rather than implicitly advanced, as it was in the voting rights
cases. In effect, minority claimants would directly challenge the consti-
tutional legitimacy of the all-white judiciary, rather than merely ad-
vance the right of voters to elect judicial representatives.
C. An Affirmative Action Impartiality Strategy
Plaintiffs could also challenge the impartiality of the racially ho-
mogenous bench using one other Fourteenth Amendment litigation
strategy. Racial minorities could seek to compel states to adopt affir-
mative action judicial selection plans in accordance with Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.'" In that case, the Supreme Court
recognized that viewpoint diversity and background can be a compel-
ling interest which justifies the use of race-conscious measures. In the
context of professional school admissions in Bakke, the Court found
that a university's First. Amendment right to create an educational
atmosphere characterized by the "robust exchange of ideas" is a "coun-
tervailing constitutional interest" to the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition of the use of racial classifications for the acceptance of stu-
dents.'" One must be quick to add that given the Court's current
composition and the numerous challenges to graduate school admis-
sions programs,' 6° the Bakke view of the value of diversity in educational
156 SeeAlexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
157 Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68.
158 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
159 See 438 U.S. at 313.
150 See, e.g., Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934, 944-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
December 1997]	 RACE AND THE JUDICIARY 	 125
institutions may not survive."' Nevertheless, a judicial impartiality man-
date could and should similarly be viewed as a "countervailing consti-
tutional interest" requiring diversity on the bench.
In Bakke, the Court specifically recognized the importance of
diversity to law and medicine. The Court described a heterogenous
learning environment as important because each of these professional
groups is likely to serve a heterogenous population in the course of
their professional work. A diverse law student body prepares lawyers to
address "the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which
the law is concerned." 162 Diversity among professional school students
brings "experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its
student body and better equip its graduates to render with under-
standing their vital service to humanity." 163 The Court's analysis with
respect to the importance of diversity applies with special force to trial
judges, the environments in which they must work and the hetero-
genous populations they, by definition, will serve. In its representative
function, the trial bench, no less than the jury venire, should reflect
the diverse values and perspectives of the community it serves.
Finally, in most jurisdictions—particularly those in the South—an
affirmative action initiative for judges could even withstand the proof
of remediation for historical discrimination required by the Supreme
Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.' 64 In that case, the Court
S. Ct. 2580 (1996) (criticising Bakke and holding that the University or Texas Law School's
admissions program, which provided preferences to minority students applying for admission,
violated equal protection); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995) (holding that University of Maryland's program that administered
merit scholarships for African American students violated equal protection). The Supreme Court
has chosen to review neither Hopwood nor Podberesky.
161 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 (relying for the most part on the decision in Adarand
Conitruction v. Pena, 515, U.S. 200 (1995), as holding that pursuing a diversity interest was no
longer compelling, and that "[ri]o case since Bakke has accepted diversity as a compelling state
interest under a strict scrutiny analysis").
Indeed all forms of state-sponsored voluntary affirmative action might have been struck down
if the Supreme Court decided Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), art
granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997). In that case, a white New Jersey school administrator had
challenged the Piscataway School Board's decision to fire her and retain an equally qualified
African American school administrator. The school board had based its decision on its desire to
promote diversity. See Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, No. 96-679, October
Term 1996 (Aug. 25, 1997) (on file with the author), available in 1997 WL 525717. The case was
settled before the Supreme Court made its decision. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, Civil
Rights Groups Pay Teacher to Avoid Court; Coalition Feared Adverse Ruling by High Court Would
Damage Affirmative Action, Cut. Dun., Nov. 22, 1997, at 1.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)). '
163 1d.
161 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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struck down a minority set-aside program for construction contracts
in the City of Richmond, Virginia in part because the Court found
that the City failed to provide specific evidence demonstrating the
existence of historical discrimination against minority contractors in
Richmond.'" Evidence demonstrating purposeful historical discrimi-
nation against African Americans in the legal profession, by contrast,
would be readily available in many jurisdictions and would support a
judicial affirmative action scheme. For example, among its many his-
torically discriminatory practices, the State of Texas denied African
Americans access to the State's law school until the practice was chal-
lenged and struck down by the Supreme Court in 1950. 1" Texas also
systematically excluded African Americans from participation in politi-
cal party primaries.' 67
 These two forms of de jure discrimination alone
effectively negated the ability of African Americans to be elected as
state court judges in Texas. Thus, even under a Croson standard, affir-
mative action for state court judges in Texas could be upheld.
D. Arguments Against Structural Impartiality
The advantages of the Fourteenth Amendment litigation chal-
lenge are clear. It raises directly the importance of racial diversity to
the integrity of the judicial system itself—not just to minority voters.
Yet, compelling racial diversity of the trial bench as a constitutional
imperative may raise at least two important concerns: one about the
role of race and perspective, the other about the administration of
our legal system. First, requiring structural impartiality on the bench
through racial diversity need not stigmatize nor essentialize the view-
points of either white or African American judges. Equating racial
diversity with increased impartiality does not brand any particular
white judge as racially biased. As the Supreme Court suggested in the
jury context, one need not assume that all-white juries actually exer-
cised biased decision-making.'" Instead, the fact of jury pool homoge-
neity, combined with the systematic exclusion of identifiable groups
166 The Court held that "[wlhile the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action
when they possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior
discrimination, they must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity
before they may use race-conscious relief." Id. at 504.
166
 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 629.
167 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (holding unconstitutional exclusion
of blacks from Democratic Party association); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-66 (1944)
(holding that rule of Texas Democratic Party excluding blacks from voting in primaries violated
the Fifteenth Amendtnent).
166 See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).
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that may hold alternative perspectives or views, creates the potential to
undermine the impartiality of the jury.' 69 In exactly the same way, the
possibility of bias is increased by an all-white bench uninformed by the
"varieties of human experience," as compared to that of a racially
diverse bench.'" Of course, racial diversity on the bench will also
change the existing racially homogenous environment on many state
benches in which judges can engage in blatantly racist conduct with
impunity, as described in some state bias commission reports."'
Nor does viewing racial diversity as a key element of impartial-
ity require one to "essentialize" the viewpoints of African American
judges—to believe that African American jurists would share the same
views or decide cases in particular ways. In the jury context the Su-
preme Court has advised: "It is not necessary to assume that the
excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude,
as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human
events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented." 172 The mere potential of racially exclusive jury pools to
exclude alternative perspectives is sufficient to implicate the Four-
teenth Amendment. The same is true of a racially homogenous trial
bench. Nevertheless, it is likely that the perspective and experiences of
African American judges will bring new insights to judicial decision-
making.' 73
A second concern or argument against structural impartiality is
the contention that African American judges would be required to
hear the cases of African American litigants. Not so. Ensuring struc-
tural impartiality on the trial bench by promoting racial diversity would
not require that African American litigants appear before African
American judges, or even that African American judges be assigned to
adjudicate racially sensitive cases. 174 Nor does it require that African
American judges recuse themselves from such cases.'" just as the jury
impartiality mandate does not guarantee litigants a right to have a
particular petit jury in a particular case reflect the racial make-up of
the community,'" the requirement of a racially diverse judiciary does
1°9 See id.; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531-33 (1 975).
17° See Peters, 407 U.S. at 503.
171 See supra notes 29-44.
172 Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04.
175 See supra notes 132-34.
174 See Higginbotham, supra note 19, at 1037 ("Pluralism does not mean that only a judge of
the same race as a litigant will be able to adjudicate a case fairly." )•
175 See discussion of race-recusal cases infra Part 11.13.
' 7° See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 482-84 (1990); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S,
522, 538 (1975).
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not mean that African American defendants are entitled to have their
cases heard by judges of the same race. Instead, the pool of potential
judges who may be assigned to a particular case—like the jury venire—
must reflect the communities from which they are selected. The inter-
action of a racially diverse group of trial judges will increase the
opportunity for all of the judges—both African American and white—
to adjudicate cases with racial dimensions with greater sensitivity, in-
formation and exposure to the diverse values and perspectives that
exist within the community.'"
IV. DEFINING REPRESENTATION FOR STATE COURT JUDGES
A. Historical Perspective
Without question, the jury occupies a central role in ensuring that
the community is represented in the administration of justice.' 78 As
such, racial diversity in jury venires is of particular importance to
ensuring fundamental fairness. Racial diversity among judges is no less
important. Historically, state judges have also served a representative
function, and increasingly state judges exercise powers traditionally
reserved for the jury.
Nevertheless, judicial diversity efforts are often hampered by an
almost universal resistance to recognizing state trial judges as repre-
sentatives. We cling to a view ofjudges as independent decisionmakers
who act without regard to the public will and outside of the political
arena. This is all the more surprising in light of the rough and tumble,
quid pro quo world of electoral and appointive politics from which
judges are selected. This view ofjudges is based largely on the idealized
conception of the judicial role in the federal judiciary and is at odds
with the historical role of state court judges.
The framers viewed an independent federal judiciary as essential
to the integrity and success of the American republic. The experience
of the colonial judge's allegiance to the King highlighted the impor-
tance of independence in the federal judiciary. The independence of
in
 As part of collegial decision-making bodies, the dynamics between trial judges on the same
court are different—less structural, less frequent—than , that of appellate judges. Nevertheless,
they do interact with each other in ways sufficient to reap the rewards of racial diversity. See
discussion infra Part N.D.
178
	 Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the fury, 5 WM, & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 29, 29 (1994)
(describing the jury as the "quintessential democratic institution"). The Supreme Court has
described the right to trial by jury as "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 156 (1968).
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the judiciary would complete the balance of the new tripartite form of
government. Separation of powers among the executive and legislative
branches of government could not be achieved without a judiciary
sufficiently detached from both branches and from the whims of the
populace. The framers thus consciously armed federal judges with the
tools needed to remain independent—lifetime tenure and removal
only by impeachment.' 79 Removing the threat of dismissal in the wake
of unpopular decisions arguably would ensure that the judges would
feel free to decide cases without regard to the approval of the politically
powerful.
Federal judges, however, constitute only a small percentage of the
nation's judges. The majority of judicial officers serve on state judici-
aries with a history far different from that of the federal bench. Nev-
ertheless, prevailing perceptions about the appropriate role of judges
derive principally from the federal model. Describing a desire for
"independence" of state judges in the same way as that of federal
judges is one example of this phenomenon. Historically, state court
judges were never viewed as pure independents. State court judges
could not be independent because their service lacked two qualities
deemed essential to judicial independence at that time: appointment
and lifetime tenure.'"
In fact, the independence of the federal judges and the scope of
their authority was created in part to counter the perceived partiality
of state court judges. One example is the creation of diversity jurisdic-
tion in federal courts. State judges were viewed as representatives of
their own state residents. At the very least, state judges were expected
to favor the interests of the residents of their own state in disputes with
residents of other states. 181 As such, state judges were expected to act
"in accordance with their rational self-interest," 182 and "apply the laws
unequally to residents and nonresidents in some types of case."'" In
The Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton argued that state land grant
I" It was widely believed that .lifetime tenure for judges was essential "to secure a steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws." TIM FEDERALIST No. 78, at 396-97 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948).
twA number of states, including New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Delaware,
did afford judges lifetime tenure 'during good behavior" in the late 1700s, °then, such as
Pennsylvania, Ncw Jersey and Georgia, provided fixed terms for judges. See Joseph H. Smith, An
Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1159-55 (1976).
181 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 173 (1985) ("WI is
not a surprise that the terms of employment of state judges (most of whom are elected) arc
indeed less conducive to judicial independence than those of federal judges.").
"2 Id. at 172.
153 Id. at 176.
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claims were the kind of case in which federal jurisdiction would be
necessary because "[t] he courts of neither of the granting states could
be expected to be unbiased . . . . [I] t would be natural that the judges,
as men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own
government."'"
Other historical accounts suggest that diversity jurisdiction was
created not to address pro-resident bias, but instead was designed to
undercut a perceived pro-debtor bias of state courts.'" Commercial
interests, therefore, sought to ensure access to a federal forum for cases
in which they needed to assert claims in courts of other states.'" In
effect, federal diversity jurisdiction was created to provide a forum in
which claims could be heard by judges who ostensibly represented no
special interests. The selection of federal question jurisdiction may
have been similarly influenced by the perceived partiality of state court
judges. In The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton cited the fact that many state
judges did not have lifetime tenure as a strong basis for securing
federal jurisdiction for cases involving federal law. 187
The move during the mid-1800s by most states from an appointed
to an elected judiciary reflects the states' own acknowledgment that
their judges are representatives. Inspired by ideas of the Jacksonian
Democracy, states during this period sought to make their judges more
representative of the public by subjecting judges to popular elections.'"
The move to select state judges by popular election rather than by
appointment was a "highly self-conscious choice of policy."
Jacksonians argued that appointed state judges were selected dis-
proportionately from the wealthy and aristocratic classes.'" While
judicial independence was an important goal, it was simultaneously
184 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 179, at 408-09.
185 See POSNER, supra note 181, at 142 (citing Judge Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928)).
196
 See id.
187 See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 179, at 415 ("State judges, holding their offices
during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for an
inflexible execution of the national laws.").
188 See EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80-101 (1944); see also David
Adamany & Philip Dubois, Electing State fudges, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 731, 769 (1976) (describing
states' judicial selection methods as of 1976).
189 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 140 (1950). The move to
elect state judges was also an express rejection of the federal model of judicial selection, which
had been greatly criticized since Marbury u Madison. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Cut. L. REV. 689, 715 (1995).
19 See Franklin S. Spears, Selection of Appellate fudges, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 501, 503 (1988);
Glenn R. Winters, Selection of fudges—An Historical Introduction, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1081, 1082
(1966).
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necessary to ensure that state judges were aware that they were
responsible to all of the people of the state.' 9 ' The switch to an elec-
tive system, it was hoped, would make judges more representative
of the entire community. Between 1846 and the outbreak of the
Civil War, twenty-four states adopted partisan election for judges. 192
Texas adopted an elective system for choosing its judges in 1850.'"
Despite some initial success in diversifying the judiciary, judicial
elections soon were themselves deemed problematic. Rather than pro-
ducing judges with greater accountability to the public, the elected
judiciary had become increasingly controlled by local political ma-
chines.'" By the turn of the twentieth century, many states began to
adopt features designed to alter the recently adopted judicial election
system. 195 In 1906, Roscoe Pound delivered a now-historic address in
which he described the election of judges as "putting courts into
politics." 1 °" During the next decade, a hybrid appointive/elective sys-
tem was devised by Pound's colleagues at the American Judicature
Society. Under that scheme, which came to be known as the Missouri
Plan, the governor appointed a judge from among one of three lawyers
selected by a judicial nominating commission. After the first year in
office, the candidate would run for election and was subsequently
subjected to periodic retention elections.'" In turn, the Missouri Plan
has been criticized for entrusting the selection of judges to "elitist"
panels and for producing an unrepresentative judiciary. 19" Although
twenty-two states have adopted some form of the Missouri Plan, a ma-
jority of states continue to elect judges.' 99 Studies have shown that most
191 See Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an
Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 348-49 (1983).
192 See Hill, supra note 13, at 846.
I"Texas has demonstrated a particularly strong policy in favor of public participation in the
selection of judicial candidates. Despite repeated attempts to reintroduce an appointive system
of selecting judges since the creation of its constitution in 1876, the Texas legislature has
consistently refused to adopt even a limited appointive system for the selection of judges. See id.
at 350-54; see also Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention offudges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J.
53, 56-57 (1986). Texas switched back to an appointed judiciary upon joining the Confederacy
in 1861. By the time it adopted its constitution in 1876, however, Texas returned to au elective
judiciary in response to dissatisfaction with "carpetbag" judges appointed by the Reconstruction
government. See Hill, supra note 13, at 347.
191 See Patrick Winston Dunn, judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals for
Reform, 4 llorsms L. Rev. 267, 286-93 (1976); see also Winters, supra note 190, at 1083.
195 See Dunn, supra note 194, at 280.
196 See Pound, supra note 11, at 24.
197 See Dunn, supra note 194, at 283.
196 See id. at 298-301.
199 See id. at 323-53.
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voters would oppose a pure appointive system for selecting judges. 200
In retaining electoral features for judicial selection, the states continue
to express the view that judges perform an important representative
function."'
B. The Supreme Court's View
The Supreme Court has, for the most part, recognized that state
court judges perform at least a limited representative function. In
Sugarman v. Dougall, 202 the Court recognized that "persons holding
state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judi-
cial positions . .. perform functions that go to the heart of repre-
sentative government."203 Yet the Court has been unable, or perhaps
unwilling, to define the nature of representation exercised by state
court judges.
In Chisom and LULAC, the Court was squarely faced with deciding
whether elected judges are representatives within the meaning of the
Voting Rights Act." In response, the Court answered the question
narrowly and mechanically—when judges are elected, they are repre-
sentatives for purposes of the Voting Rights Act. 205 The Court declined
to examine the function and performance of judges to determine how
judges in fact act as representatives. 206 Instead, the Court limited its
analysis, concluding that elections confer representative status upon
judges. Implicitly, the Court suggested that where state trial judges are
20° See id. at 517. Voters in Texas, in particular, have expressly rejected efforts to change to
an appointive system for judicial selection. See Spears, supra note 190, at 519-20 (citing referenda
and polls in which Texas voters voted overwhelmingly to continue electing state's judges). Only
two states, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, grant lifetime appointments to their appellate judges.
See RorrmAN, supra note 20, at 20.
2°1 In LULAC I, Judge Patrick Higginbotham conceded:
The history of electing judges and the . political impulses behind that choice are
powerful evidence of considered decisions to keep judges sensitive to the concerns
of the people and responsive to their changing will. . [T]his reality belies the
bold assertion that judges are in no sense representatives.
902 F.2d 293, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1990).
202 413 U.S. 634, 635-36, 646 (1973) (holding that a New York statute barring nonresident
aliens from civil service jobs was unconstitutional).
203 Id, at 647 (emphasis added).
204 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1991); LULAC I, 902 F.2d 293, 295 (5th Cir.
1990).
400 "When each of several members of a court must be a resident of a separate district, and
must be elected by the voters of that district, it seems both reasonable and realistic to characterize
the winners as representatives of that district." Chisom, 501 U.S. at 401.
206
 But the Court has commented in another context that "[,Dudges who stand for reelection
run on their records." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947). Justice Scalia, who dissented in
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appointed, they cease to be representatives. Indeed, the Court tacitly
advised that states could avoid exposing their judiciaries to the require-
ments of the Voting Rights Act by appointing their judges."
Yet in a case decided on the same day as Chisom, the Supreme
Court implicitly acknowledged the role of appointed judges as state
policymakers by describing state judges' power to "exercise . . . discre-
tion concerning issues of public importance." 208 In Gregory v. Ashcroft,
the Court determined that a Missouri statute requiring mandatory
retirement for judges at age seventy does not violate the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act. 209 The Court, relying on Sugarman, held
that the power of states to decide the qualifications of their official
decisionmakers—including judges—"lies at the heart of representative
government. "210
The Supreme Court has also described the representative function
of state judges by emphasizing that judges are not representatives in
the same way as legislators. In Wells v. Edwards, 21 I for example, a federal
court in Louisiana held that judicial electoral districts need not satisfy
the one-person, one-vote requirement of Baker v. Carr, because "[ti he
State judiciary, unlike the legislature, is not the organ responsible for
achieving representative government." 2 ' 2 A divided Supreme Court
affirmed this decision, but failed itself to define why the elected judi-
ciary is not an important feature of state representative government.
Moreover, the Court in Wells failed to address squarely how the lower
court's position contrasts with the Court's own description of the role
of judges in representative government in Sugarman.
Chisom and HLA, failed to shed any additional light on this question. Justice Scalia simply stated
"the word 'representative' connotes one who is not only elected by the people, but who also at a
minimum, acts on behalf of the people. Judges do that in a sense—but not in the ordinary sense."
Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia, however, tells nothing about
this "sense" in which judges act on behalf of the people.
2"According to the Court, appointed judges can be "indifferent to popular opinion." Chisom,
501 U.S. at 401.
2" Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1991). The judges at issue in Missouri were
first appointed then subject to retention elections. See id. at 455.
2139 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
21° See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463 (internal quotations omitted). The state of Missouri in Gregory
explicitly acknowledged the representative function of its state judges: "U udicial decision-making
. . . is an expression of public policy, no less, and perhaps more, compelling than the modes of
expression available to the legislative and executive branches of government." Brief for the
Respondent at 19, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (No. 90-50).
211 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
212 Id. at 454, 456 (quoting New York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp.
148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
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C. The Nature of Representation
Representation can be defined in many ways. At bottom, repre-
sentation may only mean what the represented want it to mean. 213
Philosopher Hanna Pitkin has identified three forms of representation:
formal, descriptive and symbolic. Pitkin also attempts to identify how
representatives "act for" others. 214
 Under the formalistic view of repre-
sentation, the representor and the represented contract with one an-
other to establish the representation relationship. This transaction
gives rise to the representative's authority to act. Yet, subsequent to the
formation of the representational relationship, the representative has
some autonomy. In this regard:
Representation is a kind of "black box" shaped by the initial
giving of authority, within which the representative can do
whatever he pleases. If he leaves the box, if he exceeds the
limits, he no longer represents. There can be no such thing
as representing well or badly; either he represents or he does
not. 215
Descriptive representation is perhaps the most familiar in the
political context. Representatives under this view should "be an exact
portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel,
reason and act like them."2 ' 6
 Here, representation may simply be "a
mere second-best approximation" of direct democracy, in which rep-
resentatives act as the people would have done. 2 ' 7 Symbolic repre-
sentation posits the representative as a symbol, which "stands for" a set
of feelings or expressions—like the flag symbolizing the country or a
set of scales symbolizing justice. 218
 In both descriptive representation
and symbolic representation, Pitkin contends that the representative
213 See Martha L. Minow, From Class Actions to Miss Saigon: The Concept of Representation in
the Law, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 269, 280-84 (1991). Thomas Hobbes describes the representative
as something akin to an "artificial person," one who "acteth by authority" or "personate(sl." See
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, TIIE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 14-20 (1972). In Hobbes's view, the
representative's actions are "owned by those whom they represent." Id. at 20. Yet Hobbes also
suggests that the representative has considerable freedom to act outside the authority conferred
upon him by those who seek representation. See id. at 21. One German theorist contends that a
representative "acts for the group with the result that his behavior is ascribed to the group." See
id. at 40. See generally id. at 38-47.
214 See PITRIN, supra note 213, at 112-43.
215 /d. at 39.
216 Id. at 60 (quoting Letter from John Adams to John Penn).
217
 See id. at 84.
218 See id. at 95-100.
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is reduced to "an inanimate object. . . . [H]e represents by what he
is or how is he regarded. He does not represent by doing anything at
all . . . ." 2 '9 Finally, Pitkin attempts to describe the "activity of repre-
senting."22° In this regard she seeks to identify "the substance or con-
tent of acting for others, as distinct from its external or formal trap-
pings."221 Pitkin finds four essential analogies which describe
representative action: (1) "agent[s] . . . acting for"; (2) "taking care of
another"; (3) "substitution" of another; and (4) "being sent" for an-
other (as with a message). 222
Reservation about the representative status of judges tends to
focus on the fear that judges will act as descriptive representatives. For
many, descriptive representation is the kind of representation ideally
practiced by legislative representatives. Some judicial diversity advo-
cates have contributed to the view that minority judges would be
expected to function as descriptive representatives. For example, "we
want judges who look like us" suggests the desire for a descriptive
representative in that it uses the visual identity of the judge as a proxy
for the perceived similarity of values and thus decision making between
the judge and the constituent. Additionally, as Pitkin notes, some may
be concerned principally with how a judge will "act for" or represent a
community or constituency. Critics of judges as representatives fear
that judges will be guided by popular will in their actions. 223
But representation, whether exercised by legislators or judges, is
a more complex and textured exercise of authority than a mere knee-
jerk response to the electorate. Constituents choose representatives at
least in part because of their faith in that representative's ability to
exercise judgment and leadership. For this reason, even legislators do
not represent simply by responding mechanically to the will of their
constituents—even assuming a detectable and uniform constituent
will. Legislators, like all elected representatives, have the potential to
perform a leadership function for their constituents by voting on issues
in a way that reflects the legislators' own moral, political and legal sense
of what is best for their community.
Lawmakers do not cease being representatives because they have
voted in a manner contrary to the wishes of their constituency. Indeed,
within the give and take of political dealing, legislators sometimes vote
212 PITKIN, supra note 213, at 113.
222 Id. at 114-15.
221 Id. at 114.
222 Id. at 121.
22.1
	 ed. at 117-18.
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in ways that are contrary to the will of their constituents. Legislators
may "cut deals" in order to gain the support of their legislative col-
leagues for other issues of greater importance or for access to avenues
of greater power through which to serve the community.224 When
constituents believe that their legislator has nevertheless "brought
home the bacon," they may continue their support and view him as
their representative even when he votes contrary to their will. Because
a representative is potentially a leader, he may, through his actions and
efforts, sway his constituents to join his view. Alternatively, the elector-
ate has the option of voting the representative out of office if they
disagree strongly enough with the position he has taken. "Leadership,
emergency action, action on issues of which the people know nothing
are among the important realities of representative government. They
are not deviations from true representation, but its very essence." 225
The core of representation may rest, therefore, in the existence of a
method of selecting representatives that provides a meaningful oppor-
tunity for that representative to respond to the people, but does not
require that the representative in all instances in fact follow the wishes
of the community. 228
 Similarly, representative judges are also not com-
pelled to adjudicate cases in the way the public would wish. 227
For judges, representation is an even more complex undertaking.
Judges represent multiple constituencies and thus may be guided in
their actions by several factors or influences.228
 Judges represent, at
once, the legal system, justice, the communities they serve, as well as
their own moral values. Judges seek to preserve the authority and
consistency of the legal system by respecting precedent and uniformity
224 Obtaining powerful or strategically important committee assignments may permit a leg-
islator to represent his community more effectively than a vote on a particular issue.
225
 PITKIN, supra note 213, at 163.
225 Represemation can include "an obligation both to the wishes of [the] constituent[] and
to the best policy as [the representative] sees it . . . ." Id. at 148. -
227 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has observed, "the judge is often called upon to . defy
. popular sentiment," Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991). During the Civil Rights
Movement, some southern judges insisted on enforcing federal law protecting the right of African
Americans to register to vote, even when to do so was at odds with the strong feelings of the white
community that had elected the judge. For an account of the courageous action of some of these
judges, sec generally CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND TIIE BALLOT: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS (1973).
228 Pitkin notes;
A judge who represents group pressures is a judge conceived as responding to group
pressures, through whom such pressures act. A judge who represents justice is one
whose actions are governed by or in accord with justice (which requires that he be
free from other restraints). This is not a matter of who authorizes the judge or who
is bound by his pronouncements. Nor is it a matter of whom (or what) the judge
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in applying legal principles.22g Because they are human, judges also
represent their own legal, moral and political visions.'" Judges also
represent the values of the communities they serve. A sophisticated
electorate ostensibly selects a judge because it trusts the judge to blend
and balance these considerations appropriately in the exercise of his
inevitable discretionary power. 23 ' If a community elects a judge, it need
not demand that he demonstrate slavish submission to the commu-
nity's demands. Instead judges may be entrusted to accurately assess
and interpret the community's standards and to apply those standards
in ways that promote fairness to the disputing litigants, consistency of
legal principle and what is best for the community. 292
The reality of state court judicial power and decision making
reveals that state judges do engage in all of the representation forms
identified by Pitkin. They are at once symbolic, descriptive and formal
representatives who "act for" several constituencies. In this regard,
judges can and do represent in the legitimate exercise of their author-
ity. These opportunities for representation further support the right of
minority groups to gain access to representation on state courts.
D. Areas of State Trial fudge Representation: Symbolism, Patronage and
Political Opportunity
Judges perform a variety of representative functions that can be
identified and that are particularly relevant to the issue of racial diver-
sity on the bench. For example, much of the effort to bring diversity
to both state and federal benches has centered around the symbolic
value of a diverse bench. Plurality on the bench enhances the appear-
symbolizes or stands for. There is no reason why even a judge whose discretion is
narrowly defined could not be a symbol of justice. What we have here is repre-
sentation as the substance, or content, or guiding principle of action.
PITKIN, supra note 218, at 117-18.
229 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil furies and the Allocation of
Judicial Power 56 Ttx. L. REV. 47, 56 (1977) (describing judicial decision snaking as "a complex
balancing of the equities of a specific Just' result against the system's need for uniformity of
decision").
2" See Higginbotham, supra note 19, at 1040-41; Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 Cm?.
Sr. L. Ray. 1, 20 (1994); Stewart G. Pollock, The Art of fudging, 71 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 591, 595 (1996).
231 But see Dunn, supra note 194, at 256-95 (describing low voter interest in judicial elections
and continued control of political parties in judicial election process). Nevertheless, judicial
elections still have the potential to provide opportunities for representation and principled
judicial decision snaking. I explore this topic in a forthcoming article. See generally lfill, supra
note 12.
2 2 The Supreme Court has determined that a judge brings to adjudication "a well-considered
judgment of what is best for the community." Chisom, 501 U.S. at 399 n.27 (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466 (1991)).
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ante of inclusion and participation. A sense of participation leads more
readily to the appearance of justice, which in turn engenders public
confidence in the justice system. 233 With public confidence in the
justice system plummeting, 234
 many argue that racial diversity on the
bench will help disaffected racial minorities, in particular, to believe
that they have a voice in the administration of justice: The value of
promoting such "confidence" among minority voters without assur-
ances of actual racial fairness in the justice system may be question-
able. 233
At a more pragmatic level, judges represent by virtue of their role
as political and community leaders. Achieving state judicial office is
often the stepping stone to attaining other political offices. In LU-
LAO" and other cases challenging at-large judicial elections, the plain-
tiffs as well as African American lawyers practicing in the local jurisdic-
tions articulated this, reason for focusing their efforts on access to state
trial courts."' They observed that minority state trial judges are key
players in the development of African American leadership in the state.
Minority state trial judges are in the pipeline to be selected for higher
state courts, for federal court judgeships or to serve in other important
leadership positions in the community. Thus, denying access to state
trial judgeships for minorities closes off an important avenue to politi-
cal power in the community.
Trial judges also have opportunities to represent their constituents
through their administrative functions. For example, trial judges often
serve on judicial committees comprised of judges sharing specialized
dockets such as family law, domestic violence or juvenile justice cases.
During monthly meetings, judges assigned to those dockets discuss new
233 See PERRY, supra note 133, at 135 (citing justice O'Connor's comment that to "gain public
acceptance, [the Supreme Court} must not be of a 'single image' or a 'single mold'" and Justice
Brennan's observation that "the sole end of making the Court diverse and reflective of America's
hetefogeneity was to foster legitimacy for it in the eyes of the American people") (footnotes
omitted).
234
 The infamous Rodney King case, in which four white Los Angeles police officers were
found not guilty of beating an African American motorist, marked an all-time low of public
confidence in the justice system. According to USA TODAY polls conducted after the verdict, 86%
of whites and 100% of African Americans interviewed said the verdict was wrong; 58% of whites
and 59% of African Americans who thought the verdict was wrong blamed the legal system as
opposed to societal racism in general. See Agreement on King, USA TODAY, May 1, 1992, at 4A.,
Tony Mauro, Experts, the Public Ask Why; Verdict Baffling to Most, USA TODAY, May 1, 1992, at 4A.
235I question the value of efforts to promote public confidence in a system that continues
to deny meaningful opportunities for minority participants to select judges and to participate on
juries.
236
 LULAC IV, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1071 (1994).
2" See infra Section I.
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issues in the law, approaches to difficult issues and problems arising
from the management of their specialized caseloads. 2  These meetings
provide opportunities for judges to expose their colleagues to alterna-
tive perspectives and viewpoints about substantive legal issues. Judges
also share decision making on issues of administration such as adop-
tion of local rules, assignment of cases, docket control or election of
administrative judges."9
Judges can also represent through patronage and quasi-patronage
appointments of bailiffs, secretaries, law clerks and other court person-
nel. In this regard, state judges differ little in their representative
capacity from other elected officials. Women judges have often been
responsible for hiring the first female judicial clerks on some courts. 24°
Similarly, the presence of African American judges often corresponds
to a marked increase in the hiring of African American court person-
nel."' The importance of these opportunities should not be underes-
timated. In the context of gender diversity in the courts, Judith Resnik
has suggested that when judges "visit with other judges at lunch, ride
judges' elevators and never or rarely see a woman judge," judges
may be insulated from exposure to the complexity and relevance of
women's issues. 2A 2 A racially homogenous work environment may simi-
larly permit judicial indifference to minority racial perspectives and
issues. A racially diverse work environment for judges may have exactly
258Judges in many jurisdictions utilize such meetings. See, e.g., WASHINGTON, supra note 13,
at 213 (interviewing South Carolina Family Court Judge Abigail R. Rogers); Interview with
Baltimore Circuit Court Judge Mabel Houze Hubbard (March 12, 1996) (notes on file with the
author).
299 In Texas, for example, district judges in each county adopt local rules of administration,
which govern assignment of cases and the docketing and transfer of cases. See LULAC I, 902 F.2d
293, 305 (5th Cir. 1990). Trial judges within each county, along with statutory judges, also come
together to elect by majority vote a local adminisuative judge. See id. at 304. Moreover, because
cases "can be freely transferred between judges and ... any judge can work on any part of a case
including preliminary matters," district judges in Texas sometimes work together on the same
cases. Id. at 304; see TEx. R. Qv, P. 330(e)—(i). These opportunities for collegial interaction
between district judges in Texas provide more formal occasions for the interchange of ideas and
perspectives.
245 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Laura W. Brill, Women in the Federal Judiciary: Three Way Payers
and the Exhilarating Change President Carter Wrought, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 281, 285 (1995).
241 See, e.g, MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC 155UES IN THE
COURTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I l (1989) (noting that "[t]here are few instances
in the Michigan judiciary of majority jurists employing minority law clerks, judicial assistants, or
commissioners"); WASHINGTON, supra note 13, at 205 (interviewing Judge Charles Z. Smith
describing his role in hiring racial minorities as law clerks in Washington state courts); Vernon
E. Jordan, Jr., Dedication to the Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, 63 U. ON. L. REv. 1519, 1522 (1995)
(describing Sixth Circuit Judge Jones's chambers with African American law clerks and secretar-
ies).
244 See Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts,
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the opposite effect. Moreover, if "courthouses belong to the people
who come to them daily—as workers,"243 a more racially balanced court
workforce may change the entire culture of the courthouse."'
Trial judges also serve a representative function by helping to
alleviate segregation in the bar. For example, many minority lawyers
have described the virtual exclusion of African American lawyers from
among those chosen by white judges for appointment to cases. 245
 In-
stead, white judges tend to appoint lawyers they have known in their
former practices to fill appointments. These lawyers also tend over-
whelmingly to be white. As a result, minority lawyers fail to garner
potentially lucrative representation opportunities from state courts and
remain professionally marginalized compared to their white counter-
parts.'" Through appointments of ad litems, special masters, mediators
and public defenders, minority judges have the dual opportunity to
increase professional opportunities for minority lawyers and for expos-
ing the mainstream bench to the minority bar.
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1709 (1991). Resnik describes this phenomenon as "acute occupational
segregation." Id.
243 /d. at 1700.
244 See TEXAS COMM'N ON JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, I REPORT—GOVERNANCE OF TIIE TEXAS
JUDICIARY: INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (Nov. 1996) (recommending increased efforts
to promote diversity among court personnel because "Uludicial branch personnel who under-
stand and are sensitive to the cultural reference points of the disputants who come before the
court are more likely to administer, and, importantly, be perceived to administer, impartial
justice").
245 See MICIIIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC ISSUES IN THE COURTS,
supra note 241, at 3 (noting "evidence that minority attorneys do not receive an equitable share
of available appointments . . . nor do they have the same access as majority attorneys to cases
which are more serious in nature, higher profile or more economically rewarding"). Although
many lawyers in states where I have litigated Voting Rights judges Caces have shared this view
with me, none wished to be identified with this statement. All expressed their continued efforts
to garner court appointments from white judges as the reason for their insistence upon anonym-
ity.
246 The consequence of this exclusion was felt directly by minority lawyers in their ability to
garner clients. Minbrity lawyers contended that the absence of racial diversity on state trial courts
effects the ability of African American lawyers to retain the confidence of potential clients from
the minority community. Instead, the exclusion of African American judges from the trial bench
encourages minority litigants to believe that African American attorneys lack the same influence
and access to power in the justice system as their white counterparts. As a result, potential clients
may choose to be represented by white attorneys in order to maximize their access to power in
the judicial system. See, e.g., GERALDINE R. SEGAL, BLACKS IN TI1E LAW: PHILADELPHIA & THE
NATION 103 (1983) (reporting from a survey of African American lawyers that "businessmen and
other members of the black community are still hesitant to use the services of black lawyers, for
they believe 'that the black client and/or lawyer will not fare as well as the white client and/or
lawyer.' If the lawyer is black, ' [judges or juries] arc more apt to [render] diminished judgments
in civil trials.'").
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E. Discretion As Representation
Most importantly, judicial discretion provides judges with signi-
ficant opportunities to perform a representative function in their ap-
proach to substantive law. At least in some instances, judges must
depart from legal materials and formal rules to exercise judicial dis-
cretion.247 While some scholars argue that judicial discretion exists in
an extremely narrow set of "hard" cases"' or where the "open texture"
of statutory language leaves some cases without a clear resolution, 249
others contend that judges exercise discretion throughout the process
of adjudication.R5° Critical scholars have argued that judges are "situ-
ated actors,"25 ' whose decision making is driven by culture, social back-
ground and context. 252 Choosing among two possible theories of law
to support a decision, deciding whether a litigant has standing, what
is a nuisance, what is "obscene," when a search is "unreasonable,"
which witnesses are credible and which are not, all require judges
to exercise discretion. In exercising their discretion, judges may at-
tempt deliberately to discern and apply the values of the community
they serve, or less cognitively may express internalized values and
247 Discretion may be exercised by judges . when "judges must go outside authoritative legal
sources in making their pronouncements." David Jennex, Dworkin and the Doctrine of Judicial
Discretion, 1992 DALHOUSIE LJ. 473, 474. Discretion can also be defined as "the power to choose
between two or more courses of action each of which is thought of as permissible." HENRY M.
HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICA-
TION OF LAW 162 (1958).
248 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-84 (1977); sec also Edwards, supra
note 13, at 855 (conceding judicial discretion is exercised at least in "very hard" cases).
249 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1965) (a judge
"fills the open spaces in the law"); H.L.A. HART, Tim CONCEPT or LAW 124-33 (1961); see also
Higginbotham, supra note 19, at 1037 (describing need for exercise of judicial discretion because
of "the many interstitial zones in the adjudicative process ... where there is no clear controlling
precedent, or sufficient legislative direction .").
252 See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1426 (1995)
(noting that the Supreme Court has nearly unlimited discretion in making standing determina-
tions); see also Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters
That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 359-61, 372-86 (1975); Nugent, supra note 230, at
3-20; Pollock, supra note 230, at 599.
251 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 Thx. L. REv. 1929, 1956-57 (1991).
252 111 fact, there is almost universal agreement that judicial decision making is affected, in
some measure, by a judge's background, experience and moral values. See Edwards, supra note
13, at 854 (While first disagreeing "that judicial results invariably flow from judges' politics, rather
than from legal principles," judge Edwards concedes that when the "court is confronted with a
'very hard' case—i.e. one in which there is no discernable 'right answer'—it may be true that a
judge's views arc influenced by his or her political or ideological beliefs,"); Kenneth L. Karst,
Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1957, 1957 (1988); Spann, supra note 250, al•1495-97.
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impulses.255 Regardless, with the exercise of judicial discretion, trial
judges serve a "representative" function, by articulating values and
infusing them with the weight of legal authority. Throughout, trial
judges are given wide latitude to exercise their discretionary authority,
at times free from exacting appellate review.
The breadth of state trial judges' discretionary power increases
considerably their opportunities to represent through adjudication.
Indeed, certain highly discretionary areas of law are deemed to be
within the exclusive purview of state trial judges. Family law matters
and criminal sentencing are two specific examples. More generally,
the entire trial process—from the articulation of claims or the appoint-
ment of counsel through final judgment—is fertile discretionary
ground.
In the family law area, federal courts have insisted upon deference
to state courts, carving out a kind of "abstention" from domestic mat-
ters. Federal courts have credited state trial courts with having particu-
lar authority and expertise to adjudicate family law matters.'" This
family law exception to federal court jurisdiction leaves state trial court
judges with almost exclusive authority over familial disputes. State trial
judges have "almost unlimited authority to shape the lives of a family
in distress."255 The vast majority of these decisions require judges to
exercise considerable discretion.256
In this capacity, state court judges make important value judg-
ments that influence the lives of not only the litigants before them, but
also .the community at large. For example, in Escambia County, Florida,
a judge removed an eleven-year-old girl from the custody of her mother
Mary Ward and granted custody to her father because the girl's mother
was a lesbian. 257 The judge granted custody to the father although he
253 See Higginbotham, .supra note 19, at 1037.
. 	 254 For a critique of this deference to state courts in so-called "domestic relations" matters,
sec Resnik, supra note 242, at 1747-51.
255
	 Hoffman, New Custody Rules Complicate the Task of, judges, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 1996,
at 135; see also Maner v. Stephenson, 677 A.2d 560, 560, 564 (Md. 1996) (upholding right of trial
judges to determine visitation rights of grandparents); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist
Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Ourfudges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1926 (1988) (describing
adjudication as "an effort at accommodation"). One recent report on New York State's new rules
regarding judicial determination as to whether relocating custodial parents in child custody cases
should be required to relinquish custody of minor children described the law as requiring "that
from now on [judges have] to use common sense." See Hoffman, supra, at B5.
256 For an example of how family law judges can exercise discretion when making child
support decisions even within the seemingly rigid confines of Maryland's child support guide-
lines, see Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 18-20 (1990).
257 See Stephanie Salter, A Cruel Close to the Case of Mary Ward, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER,
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had served a sentence for the second-degree shooting murder of his
first wife. The judge reportedly cited the girl's right to "be given the
opportunity and the option to live in a non-lesbian world." 258 In Michi-
gan, a trial court removed a child from the custody of his mother after
determining that it was more beneficial for the child to be cared for
by his paternal grandmother, rather than be in day-care while the
mother attended the University of Michigan. 259 In that case, the parents
of the boy had never been married and the then four-year-old child
had always lived with his mother. 26° These two cases vividly illustrate the
broad implications of trial court judges' discretionary decisions in
family law cases. In both instances, trial judges made important value
judgments with potentially far-reaching effects. Both decisions, if up-
held, would have the likely effect of influencing the behavior of moth-
ers who face or fear custody battles in those jurisdictions. Some would
be faced with deciding whether to hide their homosexuality, others
with the choice between educating themselves and raising their chil-
dren. Upon what basis did the judges in these cases make these discre-
tionary decisions? What standards did the judges call upon to reach
their conclusions about what was best for these children? Even if expert
psychological testimony supported their conclusions, both decisions
most likely reflect those judges' interpretation of societal values as well
as their own perceptions and values.
Similarly, imposing the death penalty may be the most powerful
example of the trial judge's role in representing community values.
Given the absence of conclusive data supporting the deterrent value
of the death penalty, imposition of a death sentence is often instead
"an expression of community outrage." 261 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has upheld the right of trial judges to articulate this outrage on
behalf of the community, even over a jury's recommendation of life
imprisonment."' Not surprisingly, imposition of the death penalty is
an area of trial judge decision-making authority that is often cited as
subject to racial discrimination. Although both juries and judges share
responsibility for the appalling racial disparity in the imposition of the
Jan. 28, 1997, at A-11. The judge's decision was upheld by the Florida First District Court of
Appeals. Mary Ward died of a heart attack while her petition for rehearing was pending before
that court. See id.
255 See id,
252 See Marcia M. McBrien, Child Care Not a Factor in Custody Derision, Mimi. 1..Aw. WKLY.,
Nov. 20, 1995, at 1.
266 See id. The trial court's decision was reversed on appeal. See id.
251 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984).
252 See id. at 457, 460, 464.
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death penalty, numerous studies document specific instances of trial
judges exhibiting racial bias in capital cases. 265
Beyond the capital case context, sentencing is one of the areas in
which state trial judges exercise the greatest and most independent
authority. 264
 State trial judges have wide latitude to impose sentences,
particularly where mandatory guidelines do not exist. Increasingly,
some state trial judges have chosen to experiment by imposing unique
sentences rather than traditional incarceration or probation, particu-
larly for juveniles or first time offenders. 265
Increasing emphasis on efficiency has also increased the power of
trial judges rather than juries to decide liability issues in criminal cases.
One manifestation of this concern has been the decreased role of
juries in deciding criminal matters. In many metropolitan jurisdictions,
judges have taken the place of grand juries in deciding whether to issue
felony indictments, as states abolish mandatory grand jury indictment
in order to save time, money and juror resources. 266
 In some jurisdic-
tions, the motivation of prosecutors in avoiding the grand jury may be
related to the refusal of jurors in some majority African American and
Latino jurisdictions to fully credit police testimony offered by prosecu-
tors. 267
 Thus, prosecutors can use a predominantly white trial bench to
undermine the power of African American and Hispanic juries. Several
states permit criminal defendants to waive their right to jury trial and
263 See Statement of George H. Kendall, supra note 33, at 3-4, 15-27.
264
 "Deciding upon the appropriate sentence for a person who has been convicted of a crime
is the routine work of judges." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 476; see People v. Superior Court, 917 P.2d
628, 630, 647 (Cal, 1996) (finding that California's "Three Strikes" law does not prevent a court
from striking prior convictions or reducing sentences). But seeJoan Biskupic & Mary Pat Flaherty,
Loss of Discretion Fuels Frustration on Federal Bench; Most District Judges Want Shift in Sentencing
Rules, WASII. PosT, Oct. 8, 1996, at Al (referring to federal judges who feel the federal sentencing
guidelines have "transferred discretion and authority from the court to prosecutors—who in
effect decide the sentence in advance by deciding what the charge will be").
255 See, e.g., WASIIINGTON, supra note 13, at 51. Among others, convicted defendants have
been required to write book reports, register to vote or permit a crime victim to take items from
a convicted thief's home, and "slumlords" have been sentenced to "do time" in the substandard
housing they own. See id.; John J. Goldman, Sentence Called a Vacation for Landlord, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1988, at 4. Judges have imposed upon convicted defendants some rather unique and
controversial sentences as well, for example: agreeing to voluntary castration of sex offenders, see
Bryan Denson, Drastic Measures; Parlor to Prison, Debate Continues, Hous. PosT, June 5, 1994, at
Al; ordering defendant to erect a sign warning passersby he is a convicted felon (sentence later
rejected by Illinois Supreme Court), see Dave McKinney, State Supreme Court Rejects Shaming
Penalty for Farmer, Cm. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 18, 1997, at 24; ordering defendant to stand on a street
corner for hours a day carrying a sign stating "I'm a convicted thief," see Associated Press,
Shame-Wielding Judge Has Burglar Wear Sign, Ctn. Tani., Apr. 16, 1997, at 17.
266 See Jan Hoffman, No Longer Judicially Sacred, Grand Jury is Under Review, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 1996, at Al.
267 See Jeb Bush, Common Ground Will Help Heal Racial Rift, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauder-
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have an entire criminal case heard before a judge rather than a jury. 268
In these cases, judges stand in the place of juries as the community of
peers determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Trial judges enjoy largely unfettered discretion in decisions relat-
ing to the conduct of trials. Trial judges control the courtroom and
the actors in it, be it the appointment of attorneys for indigent defen-
dants, the treatment of the parties in the court, controlling the behav-
ior of counsel, identifying racist use of peremptory challenges, accept-
ing pleas, the handling of witnesses or judicial commentary during
sentencing or ruling. 269 Trial judges' discretionary power includes con-
trol over the balance of power exercised by the participants in litiga-
tion. The quality of counsel appointed to represent indigent defen-
dants, for example, particularly in capital cases, has long been viewed
as the strongest factor affecting the outcome of criminal cases. 27° Nu-
merous instances have been cited when the lack of competent counsel
has resulted in a death sentence for a defendant in a capital case. 27 '
The experience or inexperience of counsel can be easily determined
by the appointing judge. The competence or incompetence of pro-
spective capital case counsel, while more difficult to quantify, is still
well within the trial judge's ability to assess. 272
dale), Oct. 22, 1995, at 11-1; Adam Permian, The Race Angle in the Simpson Case, BOSTON GLone,
Oct. 16, 1994, at 2.
268 Such states include New York, California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Florida and Illinois.
Although most states with jury-waiver laws require the consent of both the prosecutor and judge,
see, e.g., N.Y.Carat, PROC. LAW § 340,40 (McKinney 1994), sonic states permit defendants to waive
jury trial unilaterally. See, e.g., TEX. Caim, P. CODE ANN. § 1.14 (West 1997).
259 During the Civil Rights Movement, activists described the effect that the behavior of judges
in the courtroom had on their activism. A trial judge's decision to announce an order in open
court requiring recalcitrant southern registrars to comply with federal laws protecting the rights
of African Americans to register to vote, was viewed by some as a signal from the judge to African
American spectators that a particular judge would be vigilant and public in protecting minority
voting rights. See HAMILTON, supra note 227, at 155-56.
27° See, e.g., Gary Coodpaster, The Thal for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 302-05 (1983). Appointment of indigent counsel by trial judges can
also be a critical factor in the outcome of custody cases in which children have been removed by
the state or city from homes in which abuse or neglect has been charged. See William Wesley
Patton, Standards of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Child Protection and Parental Severance Cases, 27 LOY. U. Ctn. L.J. 195, 200-23 (1996).
271 See Bright & Keenan, supra note 4i, at 800-03.
272 1n one particularly egregious case, a trial judge appointed the Imperial Grand Wizard of
the Ku Klux Klan to defend an African American man accused of killing an elderly white woman
in Georgia. See Testimony of George H. Kendall, supra note 33, at 4. Trial judges in Houston have
been criticized for repeatedly appointing one lawyer known for sleeping during trial to defend
clients charged in capital cases. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick" Keenan, Judges and the Politics
of Death: Deriding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases; 75 B.U. L. REV.
760, 802 (1995). The GeOrgia case was initially affirmed. See generally Ross v. State, 326 S.E.2d
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Trial judges also control the process by which attorneys select
jurors from the venire for trial. In some jurisdictions, the judge himself,
not the attorneys, conducts voir dire. 273 In other jurisdictions, trial
judges control the depth and length of voir dire conducted by trial
counsel. As some legal observers increasingly have criticized lengthy
voir dire conducted by some attorneys, judges may be assigned even
more controlling roles in the voir dire process." 4
Challenges to the racial use of peremptory strikes are adjudicated
initially by trial judges. When a defense lawyer, for example, challenges
a prosecutor's strike of African American venire persons, the trial judge
determines whether the excuse offered by the prosecutor for the strike
is a pretext for discrimination. The failure of many judges to enforce
vigilantly the constitutional prohibition against racially biased peremp-
tories has been well-documented and is often a central issue in appeals
of capital convictions."' Trial judges may also permit bias to infect
attorneys' exercise of for cause" juror strikes. 276
Trial judges may determine the length of witness testimony,
whether some witnesses will be permitted to provide live testimony
rather than written testimonial summaries or reports, and even if
prospective witnesses are permitted to testify at all. Similarly, in re-
sponse to overloaded dockets, many jurisdictions strongly encourage
trial judges to promote settlement of cases and to play a more active
role in promoting settlement among parties. 277 Trial judges are power-
ful in their own right and highly influential on others. Strong evidence
194 (Ca. 1985) (affirming Georgia conviction on direct appeal). Bul see generally Ross v. Kemp,
393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990) (ordering new trial in Georgia case because of gross ineffectiveness of
counsel). In the Texas "sleeping lawyer" case, the trial judge reportedly responded to the capital
defendant's complaint about his lawyer by pointing out "[t) he Constitution doesn't say the lawyer
has to be awake." See John Makeig, Asleep on the Job?; Slaying Trial Boring Lawyer Says, Hons.
CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35.
275 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 722 (1992) (In Illinois, the trial judge, rather than
the attorneys, conducts voir dire.).
274 See Streamlining Jury Service, Al Last, NY. Timms, Nov. 8, 1995, at A24 (describing new
voir dire rules in New York State requiring judges to exert greater control over the process).
276 For a discussion of race-based peremptory challenges, and the failure of judges to enforce
the Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985), principle, see Bright & Keenan, supra note 272, at
795-96. See also United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1159-63 (3d Cir. 1989) (Higgin-
bothamd., concurring) (citing cases and articles demonstrating judges' dereliction in enforcing
the constitutional prohibition against racially-based peremptories).
276 In one instance, a judge in a wage and sex discrimination case refused to excuse a
potential juror for cause although that juror stated that und& no circumstances would he allow
his wife to work outside the home. See THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. ON GENDER BIAS
IN THE COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ACHIEVING
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN TIIE COURTS (DRAFT REPORT) § 4, 25 (1990).
277 Akhough this movement has been strongest at the federal level, evidence exists suggesting
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suggests that trial judges' own biases may infect the responses of other
courtroom participants. Jurors in particular may be influenced by
judicial bias.278 Trial judges have the power to control the dynamic of
the courtroom that is often the locus of racially charged behavior. In
fact, judges are required by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to
exercise their authority over the courtroom to ensure that no one
engages in bias.279 When judges do not purge racial bias from their
courtrooms, they affirmatively engage in bias themselves by failing to
acknowledge the important connection between the presence of ra-
cism in the courtroom and the legitimacy of the legal process.2"
Finally, trial judges' discretionary decisions are virtually unreview-
able and can .only be reversed if they are clearly erroneous. 28 ' This high
standard of review is premised on the perceived proximity of the trial
judge to the intensity and dynamic of the live dispute. The trial judge
is viewed by the appellate court as being in the best position to assess
the interaction among lawyers and potential jurors, the demeanor of
witnesses and the physical evidence offered. The trial judge serves as
the eyes and ears of the dispute to all other subsequent reviewers of
the case. The record, the authoritative account of the legal dispute, is
that states are moving in a similar direction. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cams. Settle":
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342-46, 1387-91 (1994),
Many noted scholars have criticized efforts to promote a pro-active role for judges in settlement
as undermining the power of litigation. See Owen M. Piss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1085-87 (1984) (arguing that settlement deprives courts of ability to explicate law); Judith Resnik,
Managerial fudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 380, 443-45 (1982).
276
	 Nugent, supra note 230, at 57-58 and sources cited therein. This is not surprising.
jurors, untutored in the law and court procedures, focus on the judge, who holds a position of
authority and expertise. jurors may unconsciously pick up cues from judges' verbal and non-ver-
bal communication which affects their view of lawyers, witnesses and parties.
276 Canon 3(B) (4) of the 1990 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT requires a judge to be
patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses and lawyers and to exact similar
conduct of his stair, court officials and others sulijeci to his direction and control. MooKt. Cone
or JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(13)(4) (1990). The Code further directs a judge to be unswayed
by partisan interests and imposes a duty to hear all proceedings fairly. See Canon 3(B)(2) &
28° One illustration from the Gender Bias reports makes the point clearly. In Minnesota, only
28% of male judges surveyed thought it was highly objectionable for an attorney to address a
female witness by her first name while addressing male witnesses by their last names. See MINNE-
SOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT 94-95
(1989). Where a judge fails to acknowledge the obvious connection between the respect accorded
witnesses by attorneys and the jury's response to the credibility of that witness, the responsibility
for bias falls not only on the attorneys that treat male and female witnesses differently, but on
the judge, who by neglecting to curb this behavior, endorses bias in the court himself,
281 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-81 (1985) (holdihg that in
applying "clearly erroneous" standard to findings of district court, appellate courts must give great
deference and constantly bear in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo);
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984) (noting that trial court's findings are overturned only
for manifest error). .
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controlled by the trial judge's decisions as to what evidence, arguments
and testimony will be heard and admitted. Thus, the trial judge per-
manently imposes his vision onto the dispute. The state trial judge's
factual decisions are entitled to particular deference by a federal re-
viewing court."'
In essence, the reality of state trial court decision making reveals
the many explicit and affirmative instances in which trial judges func-
tion as representatives in adjudication. Racial diversity in this context
becomes more than a "symbolic" exercise in participation. Instead, the
exclusion of racial minorities from the trial bench hints at a larger
measure of exclusion of racial minorities from full citizenship partici-
pation in their democratic state government. The result of this exclu-
sion, particularly given the disproportionate power exercised by the
justice system in regulating the lives of minority citizens,'" is that
African Americans have diminished opportunities to control their com-
munities,
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the role of judges as representatives opens up the
diversity debate to more vigorous and honest exchange. Accepting the
representativeness of judges permits us to center the discussion not on
whether we can appoint one or two minority judges to increase the
facial legitimacy of the bench, but more appropriately on dismantling
judicial selection systems which maintain the exclusion of racial mi-
norities from an entire branch of government. To that end, states that
use either appointive or elective systems to select their judges should
work in concert with the citizenry and the bar to construct selection
methods that satisfy the requirements for representation compelled by
our democratic form of government.
Much of the work will have to be done by the organized local and
national bar and judges themselves, many of whom remain highly
invested in preserving an historical, inappropriate and false depiction
of judges as "anointed priests set apart from the community . . ." 284
Similarly, diversity advocates will need to pursue plurality on the bench
282
 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has been interpreted to require that federal courts reviewing state trial
proceedings accord the trial judge's factual findings a "presumption of correctness," See Wain-
wright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426-29 (1985).
283 For example, recent figures from the Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that 51% of the
nation's state and federal prison population is African American. See MARC MAUER, INTENDED
AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: STATE RACIAL DISPARITIES IN IMPRISONMENT 3 (1997).
2" Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978) (quoting Bridges v.
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as a right rather than as a discretionary policy. If racial diversity is a
right, efforts to achieve diversity must include the willingness to chal-
lenge—with litigation if necessary—the continued exclusion of full
participation by racial minorities on state benches throughout the
country. Additionally, judicial diversity advocates will need to face
head-on questions that focus on the role of race in judicial decision
making. If diversity, as I suggest, increases impartiality by bringing
together differing perspectives in the community, then my analysis
assumes that the varying racial experiences of judges may affect their
viewpoints."' While I believe that taking this analytic step is both
inevitable and important, the adoption of this view conflicts with pre-
vailing notions of "colorblindness" adhered to by many civil rights
advocates and further challenges the "impartiality" ideal as applied to
judges.
Finally, identifying effective methods of selecting state court
judges remains a difficult and thorny task. The methods chosen ideally
should ensure the selection of qualified judges, create opportunities
for maximum citizen participation and produce racial diversity. In
order to achieve these aims, a wholesale dismantling of currently used
selection methods may be necessary. Judges, civil rights advocates, the
bar, politicians, political parties and the citizenry itself will all need to
participate in this effort. The marshalling and participation of these
varied groups may prove an insurmountable obstacle to real reform
efforts, but the lessons of the last century may prove helpful. Over a
thirty-year period, the movement to change the way judges were se-
lected swept the country. The result was a new method of judicial
selection that would, it was hoped, bring the judiciary closer to the
people. Reform efforts to bring meaningful racial diversity to the
bench may only be at the very beginning of a thirty-year push. The
results may, however, complete the efforts of those judicial reformists
a century ago who recognized the importance of representation on the
bench.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 291-92 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). The Supreme Court in
Landmark Communications cautioned against portraying judges in this manner See id.
285 See 11111, supra note 12, at 87-92.
